



MANAGING RISK

DNV

# Fundamentals of Laboratory Biosecurity and Biosafety Risk Assessments

## Conceptual Considerations



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# Intentional – Unintentional Biorisk



# Biosecurity is different

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- Dealing with actors that will
  - Explore and exploit opportunities to reach their goals
  - Potentially try to circumvent risk mitigating measures

➔ Proactive risk *mitigation* (“us”)

➔ Proactive risk *generation* (“them”)

- What are the Implications of this New Paradigm?
- Does it affect me and my organization?
- If so, how and why ?

# Outline

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- Biosecurity and Biosafety compared, standard risk assessment
- Conclusions

# Risk Assessment


- Risk assessment is the overall process of

- risk identification,
- risk analysis, and
- risk evaluation



- Essential part of any risk management processes

# The Platform: ISO 31000 - Risk Management






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- Risk assessment is always done towards one or more objectives
  
  - In our setting:
    - Biosecurity
  
    - Biosafety



# Risk Identification



# Risk Identification

- *A process to find, list and characterize elements of risks (ISO 73)*
- Include risks whether or not they are under the control of the organization





## Risk Identification: *Conceptual Risk Traits and Triggers*


	<b>Biosecurity Risk</b>	<b>Biosafety Risk</b>
<b>Trigger</b>	Gain, or desire to harm or threaten	Breakages, errors in operation, or system failures
<b>Trait</b>	Purposeful	Accidental
<b>Initiator</b>	Man	Man or nature
<b>Origin</b>	External, possibly with insider(s)	Internal, possibly external



## Risk Identification: *Conceptual Risk Characteristics*


	<b>Biosecurity Risk</b>	<b>Biosafety Risk</b>
<b>Targeted (time, scope, location)</b>	Yes	No
<b>Tailored</b>	Yes	No
<b>Damage-maximizing</b>	Possibly	No
<b>Discriminatory</b>	Possibly	No
<b>Opportunistic</b>	Often	Never

# Risk Analysis




- *Systematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the risk (ISO 73)*
- Information can include **historical data, theoretical analysis, informed opinions**, and the **concern of stakeholders (ISO 73)**
- Involves consideration of the **causes** and **sources** of risk, their **consequences**, and the **likelihood** that those consequences may occur.
- Risk analysis may be **qualitative, semi-quantitative** or **quantitative**, or a **combination** of these

# Biosafety Risk Estimation



# Biosecurity Risk Estimation





# Risk Analysis: Risk Probabilities and Consequences

	<b>Biosecurity Risk</b>	<b>Biosafety Risk</b>
<b>Probability</b>	Likelihood	“Frequency”
<b>Consequence</b>	Optimized	Often predicable, yet arbitrary

# Risk




- *Combination of the probability of an event and its consequences (ISO 73)*

- Risk = Probability x Consequences


- Risk (safety) = P (“frequency”) x C (“arbitrary”)

- Risk (security) = P (Intentions, capabilities) x C (“optimized”)

“Optimized” does not necessary mean “maximized”



# Risk Evaluation



# Risk Evaluation

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
- Determine the significance of the risk
- Assist in making decisions about treating or accepting risk

# Risk Evaluation: Information and Competence


	<b>Biosecurity Risk</b>	<b>Biosafety Risk</b>
<b>Facility information</b>	Interest to suppress	Interest to share
<b>Competence demands</b>	Understanding of Assets, Threats, Asset-Threat relations	Understanding Assets

# Concerns and Competence


- Core Concern: **Biosafety**
- Core Competencies:
  - Pathogens and toxins
  - Work processes and procedures
  - Rules and regulations



- Core Concern: **Biosecurity**
- Core Competencies:
  - Pathogens and toxins
  - Work processes and procedures
  - Rules and regulations
  - Potential perpetrators
  - Site Vulnerabilities
  - ... **and their interplay..**



# Risk Treatment



# Risk Treatment

- *Process of selection and measures to modify risks (ISO 73)*
- Measures may include avoiding, optimizing, transferring or retaining risks





# Risk Treatment: Residual Risk

	<b>Biosecurity Risk</b>	<b>Biosafety Risk</b>
<b>Residual risk</b>	“Dynamic”	“Static”

→ “Proactive (and continued) risk *generation*”

We act on **perceived risk** rather than objective measures of risk

- Perceptions likely to grow particularly strong when
  - Risk assessments more dependent upon assumptions, than a strong experience- and knowledge-base
  - Strong (excessive) media attention
  - Several factors increasing personal concern are fulfilled.....:

# Inclinations: Factors Increasing Concern

Biosecurity more prone to personal “preferences” than biosafety...!?

	Biosecurity	Biosafety
Uncontrollable	++	+
Fatalities grouped in space and time	++	+
Effects dreaded	++	+
Unfamiliar	+++	+
Children at risk	++	+
Identifiable victims	++	++
Much media attention	+++	+
Involuntary	+++	+++
Caused by human actions or failures	+++	+++

Covello V.T., Sandman P.M. and Slovic P. (1988), Risk Communications, Risk Statistics and Risk Comparisons: A manual for plant managers. Washington DC: Chemical Manufacturers Association.

*Legend: more pluses, potentially higher perceptual impact (possible values)*

- Organizational factors
  - Risk management
  
- Resources, prioritizations
  - Limited funds highly likely
  - Low-probability/high consequences
  
- Synergies and conflicts
  - Signs, information,....,
  - Learning
  
- Updated competence
  - “moving target”



# Conclusions



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- Biosecurity more than an extension of strong Biosafety
- Intentional acts add important dimensions to Biosecurity risks
- Biosecurity scenarios entail different actors, triggers and origins
- **Biosecurity risk assessments and responses differ accordingly,**
  - **Need for dedicated expertise, tools, and assessments**

- A definitive need to understand implications of biosecurity risk responses
  
- New demands on the organization, the management, and personnel
  - Competence: biosecurity risk assessment and risk management
  - Acceptance: new SOPs and measures beyond personal protection
  - Awareness: e.g. new considerations on role of perception
  - Alertness: new set of persistent risk treatment challenges
  
- Tools and methodology development

# Conclusions, finally

- **Biosecurity and Biosafety assessments should be conducted separately,**

**BUT**

- **Biosecurity and Biosafety governed under the same Biorisk Management System**



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