



A BRIEF LOOK AT SOME LABORATORY ACQUIRED INFECTIONS

Heather Sheeley

Former Co-chair International Biosafety Working Group/IFBA Past President European Biosafety Association Past Chair Institute of Safety in Technology and Research Biosafety Programme Lead UK Health Protection Agency

OVERVIEW

New material

Cases that may or not have been

• Lessons to learn

• Disclaimer



Study

- Laboratory exposures review
- Six years of data from primary clinical, clinical research, academia and research laboratories
- Statistical data on staff at risk, correlation with number of samples and types of procedures, staff grades and training
- Common areas
- Interventions



BACKGROUND

UK Biological agents (COSHH) and Reporting of Diseases and dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR)

- Incidents were they has potentially been exposure to a biological agent likely to cause severe disease.
- Acute illness
- Bites and needle sticks
- Listed diseases
- When medical treatment has been given

KNOW YOUR ORGANISM




NEISSERIA MENINGITIDIS -GROUP B MALTOSE NEGATIVE

- G-Urinary urine specimen
- Unusual
- Discrimination from gonorrhoae and cinerea

Not identified until after handling on bench Airborne risk

Antibiotics given No adverse affects



KNOW YOUR PROTOCOL




CORYNEBACTERIUM DIPHTHERIAE LAI

- Seconded to another lab
- Unlearned technique/adequate training
- Molecular study
- Understanding of aerosol generation

Taking loop of frozen blood glycerol containing live culture.

On bench

Difference of risk assessment for research vs. diagnostic Adequacy of training and supervision Nature of secondment Competency



BACILLUS ANTHRACIS -NEEDLESTICK

 Syringe containing anthrax inoculum passed between two team members. Grazed hand blood drawn but glove intact.

PPE Vaccinated Immediately reported Precautionary antibiotics given

Awareness of correct use of syringes Adequate PPE Vaccination Knowledge of need to report



KNOW YOUR EQUIPMENT

LIGHTS ON BUT NO ONE HOME!

• Two cases of use of biosafety cabinets

- Lights on but this did not run the fans
- Fans on but transport plate still in place several months after installed.

Over-reliance on others to check BSC Poor understanding of checks and meaning of indicators

Proper installation Training of installers **and** users Management issues around responsibilities



NEISSERIA MENINGITIDIS - LAI

- Admitted to hospital with meningococcal sepsis. Confirmed Group B
- Worked in lab with neisseria spp.s

Worked on open bench when inoculating API strip and sub-cultured blood culture from directly vented bottle

Pre existing condition Staffing cover Venting arrangement had altered due to supply issues



MYCO BACTERIUM TUBERCULOSIS -EXPOSURES

- Sub-culturing when wooden swab snapped and landed outside biosafety cabinet
- Two incidents of discarded cultures being incorrectly disposed of 1) outside 2) broken
- Omission to perform "kill" step of assay

Risk assessment on swab type Knowledge of procedures following incident including fumigation and OH access. Thin walled bottles received from overseas Waste procedures inadequately implemented Checks on following procedure and management of work pressures

KNOW THE DISEASE AND SYMPTOMS

SALMONELLA AGONA - LAI

- Graduate in chemistry
- Training/competence

Worked on bench with a number of strains of salmonella No gloves

Fragmented lab environment Lighting and bench colour Pipetting technique Glove use Competency and supervision



SHIGELLA SONNEI - LAI

 Two cases of staff at different sites off work with diarrhoea and cramps for more than 9 days

Both attributed this to eating in local restaurants Both had been in and handled specimens with an enterics lab just prior to being ill. Strain found to nearly identical to patient strains handle in the incubation period

No evidence of poor hygiene Relaxed attitude to work within enteric area Did not recognise symptoms nor attend GP

16

MRSA - LAI

• General bench diagnostic procedures

Developed infected hand that was unresponsive to treatment General neuralgia

Individual had splits in the nail bed "quicks" (hyponychium) Laboratory tradition not to wear gloves Poor hygiene practices



INCIDENTS THAT NEVER WERE!

RELEASE OF MYCOBACTERIUM TUBERCULOSIS

 Chemostat tap clip became undone and a volume of culture was released


Chemostat enclosed in Class III safety cabinet with bund Vented via double hepa filter, tested and working correctly


No exposure no release outside validated containment Not treatment no risk to staff or environment BSC contained means to deal with spillage.



HISTOPLASMA CAPSULATUM

- Blood specimen
- Incubated at 25 and 37 degrees
- Spotted as having formed mycelium at 25 hence pathogen removed directly to BSL3
- Thermal dimorph
- Patient had been in bat caves overseas





LESSONS

- Training and supervision
- Don't assume
- Understand equipment and its use
- Know and reinforce disease characteristics
- Understand aerosol production
- Have and rehearse response for adverse incidents
- Accommodation can prevent good practice



