

MIDWEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Thinking More About Biosecurity


(Attitudes and Opinions on Biosurety)

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Serving Clients One Breakthrough at a Time



Integration of Biosurety as Part of Biosecurity





Why Should You Care?

- There are currently variations in federal biological reliability programs
 - Any facility that accepts DoD funding/select agents must comply with DoD Biosurety regulations
 - DoD program is most defined and stringent, there may be a government tendency to push it to other federal and state agencies
- Impacts biosafety program.
- There are better ways of improving/monitoring personnel reliability-you may have some ideas
- Research funding implications



Recently Completed Studies

- Congressional Research Report March 5, 2009, Oversight of Highcontainment Biological Laboratories.
- American Association for the Advancement of Science Report: Biological Safety Training Programs as a Component of Personnel Reliability, March 2009
- National Science Advisory Board for Biosurety (NSABB): Enhancing Personnel Reliability among Individuals with Access to Select Agents, May 2009
- Defense Science Board: Department of Defense Biological Safety and Security Program, May 2009
- Trans-federal Task Force on Optimizing Biosafety and Biocontainment September 2009
- National Academy of Sciences Report on (Personnel Reliability Sept 2009)



Recent Personnel Reliability Recommendations

- Defense Science Board (May 2009):
 - Monitoring: "Make changes to monitoring activities to improve effectiveness without introducing overly intrusive measures." "Review the usefulness of the two-person rule in preventing insider threats"
 - Scientific Enterprise: "Balance risk of a malevolent insider against detriment to the laboratory mission."
 - Compliance inspections: "provide resources for a single independent inspection team comprised of authoritative individuals".

DoD recognizes that current Biosurety program is harming the scientific enterprise



Recent Personnel Reliability Recommendations

- National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB): Enhancing Personnel Reliability among Individuals with Access to Select Agents.
 - No national Personnel Reliability Program recommended
 - Current SRA process should be strengthened.
 - Culture of responsibility and accountability should be enhanced.
 - Professional societies should encourage on ongoing dialog about PRP!
 - List of select agents and toxins should be reduced or stratified.

NSABB recommends WHO approach to personnel reliability



Survey Design

- Biosafety questions
- Biosecurity questions
- Attitudes on aspects of biosurety
- Demographic questions
- Redundancy built into questions
- Use of scaled responses



Survey Demographics (ABSA)


- 149 Responded to the questionnaire
- 92.5% from the U.S. (106 responded)
- 88.7% ABSA Members (106 responded)
 - > RBP (5.7%)
 - > CBSP (9.4%)
- Employment Sector (106 responded)
 - > 41.0% Academic
 - > 31.4% Government
 - ➤ 22.9% Industry/Private
 - > 4.8% Other




Survey Results: Background

- Employer currently uses a personnel reliability (Biosurety) program (PRP) (149 responded)
 - > 48.6% Yes
 - > 51.4% No
- Personal involvement in the PRP (124 responded)
 - > 55.6% Yes
 - > 15.3% No
 - ➤ 29.0% Not applicable
- Does this PRP affect the biosafety program in a positive way? (110 responded)
 - ➤ 50% Agree or Strongly agree
 - > 20% Strongly disagree or Moderately disagree
 - > 30% No opinion








Least Common PRP component: Mental Evaluations
Most Common PRP component: Criminal Records Check



Survey Results: Background

- Does this PRP affect the biosafety program in a positive way? (110 responded)
 - > 50% Agree or Strongly agree
 - > 20% Strongly disagree or Moderately disagree
 - > 30% No opinion






Most biosafety professional respondents feel that PRP has a positive effect on biological safety and security







As before, most biosafety professional respondents feel that PRP has a positive effect on biological safety and security but (as before) there is a strong minority opinion



Survey Results: Regulation

- Should there be more or less mandatory federal regulations regarding safety training for select agent research? (109 responded)
 - > 58.7% More
 - > 41.3% Less
- Should biosafety professionals be licensed by the government to perform select agent work? (109 responded)
 - > 24.8% Yes
 - > 48.6% No
 - > 26.6% Unsure



Survey Results-Professional Aspects


- Should biosafety professionals adopt a code or oath of conduct for select agent research? (109 responded)
 - > 56.0% Yes
 - > 23.9% No
 - > 20.2% Unsure
- If new mandatory safety procedures training is required for persons working with select agents, should training be provided by safety personnel? (109 responded)
 - > 84.4% Yes
 - > 6.4% No
 - ▶ 9.2% Unsure



Survey Results-Professional Aspects

- Regarding training provided by safety personnel, should these trainers be required to be trained themselves before training others? (109 responded)
 - > 82.6% Yes
 - > 1.8% No
 - > 4.6% Unsure
 - ➤ 11.9% Not applicable
- The U.S. Government established different regulations and guidelines for working with BSAT; the convergence to a single set of requirements, guidelines and regulations is needed (106 responded)
 - > 77.3% Strongly agree or Agree
 - > 15.1% Moderately disagree or Strongly disagree
 - > 7.5% Have no opinion






Most biosafety professional respondents feel that there should be national standards set for PRP



Survey Results-Biosecurity

- CCTV is an absolute requirement to maintain appropriate laboratory security (106 responded)
 - > 37.7% Strongly agree or Agree
 - > 53.8% Moderately disagree or Strongly disagree
 - > 8.5% Have no opinion
- The two-person integrity rule is essential for mitigating the risk of unauthorized diversion of BSAT(106 responded)
 - > 51.9% Strongly agree or Agree
 - ➤ 41.5% Moderately disagree or Strongly disagree
 - ➤ 6.6% Have no opinion





The most common physical security measures include locked doors, administrative policies and designated security personnel



Survey Results-Background Checks


- The current investigative program to allow access to BSAT laboratories under the DHHS, referred to as an SRA, is adequate (106 responded)
 - > 51.9% Strongly agree or Agree
 - ➤ 26.4% Moderately disagree or Strongly disagree
 - > 21.7% Have no opinion
- The NACLC is a more appropriate background investigation for allowing access to BSAT (106 responded)
 - ➤ 32.1% Strongly agree or Agree
 - ➤ 30.2% Moderately disagree or Strongly disagree
 - > 37.7% Have no opinion



Survey Results-Medical and Behavioral

- Medical and behavioral surveillance (DOD and Army Biosurety) is the most effective program to mitigate the insider threat (106 responded)
 - ➤ 24.5% Strongly agree or Agree
 - > 47.2% Moderately disagree or Strongly disagree
 - ➤ 28.3% Have no opinion
- Self-reporting of medical and personal issues that may affect access to BSAT laboratories is an adequate program to mitigate the various risks (106 responded)
 - ➤ 49.1% Strongly agree or Agree
 - ➤ 42.4% Moderately disagree or Strongly disagree
 - > 8.5% Have no opinion





Most biosafety professional respondents may have concerns that their parent organization may not have enough fiscal or human resources for PRP



Survey Summary

- There is a wide diversity of experience in ABSA with PRP: about 150 ABSA members (~9%) responded to most portions of the questionnaire.
- The majority of ABSA respondents feel PRP is an important part of biosecurity and biosafety programs. However, ~20% do not agree with major aspects of the program, ~30% unsure.
- 3. Wide diversity of PRP approaches used in current PRP programs.
- Some useful narrative comments were made on the utility of the survey.



Directions for the Future

- Extend survey to all ABSA and CDC SRA registrants.
 http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=fFR_2bXs7ndG
 WHs0xLqqaZbQ_3d_3d
- 2. Gather fully burdened costing data for different lab types (i.e. government, academic, commercial) on PRP programs
- 3. Recommend changes to PRP that will minimize out-sourcing of science to countries without surety or minimal surety programs.
- 4. Implement regulations/guidelines that provide real improvements to biosecurity/biosurety vs. perceived security (e.g. counting vials)
- 5. Develop a unified (WHO-like) approach to personnel reliability and mitigate "holes" in all PRP programs while minimizing the effect on the scientific enterprise (local control).
- 6. Publish expanded survey results for use by policy makers.