

External Briefing Document

Taking a Second Look at BSL-2

The Role of BSL-2 Training in Biosecurity

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Overview

- ▶ Discuss training gaps created by current approach to biosecurity training
- ▶ Discuss a methodology for competency training and proficiency testing in biosecurity
- ▶ Demonstrate implementation of suggested methodology using a biosafety training example



Definition

▶ Biosecurity

- Measures to address the risk that biological materials may be misused or accidentally or intentionally released.

▶ Laboratory Biosecurity

- Measures taken inside a facility containing or working with biological hazards to assure that working practices defend against misuse, accidental or intentional release of a biological hazard.



Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard Training Requirement

- ▶ The organization shall ensure that personnel that have responsibilities and/or perform tasks that may impact biorisk management in the workplace are competent to do so...The organization shall define required competency levels

AAAS Recommendations

- ▶ All **BSL-3 and BSL-4** biosafety training should incorporate proficiency (i.e., competency-based) training and testing.
- ▶ Programs should include performance-based training standards



Elements Influencing Biosecurity Risk

Training Topics	Type of Threat	Legislative Response	Target BSL	Biosecurity Training Response (BSL)
Biological Material	Personnel and External	Legal	2-4	3-4
Facility and Engineering	Personnel and External	Guidelines	2-4	3-4
Security/ Access Control	Personnel and External	Guidelines	2-4	3-4
Management	Personnel	Guidelines	2-4	3-4
Working Procedures	Personnel	BBP and Guidelines	2-4	2-4

- ▶ Targeting legislation and training to BSL-3 and BSL-4 leaves large gaps in personnel training in a biosecurity program.



Safety and Security are a Numbers Game

RISK = FREQUENCY × SEVERITY

- ▶ Greatest and Least Facts about Biohazards in BSL-2 Laboratories
 - Largest number of laboratories
 - Largest population of people working with organisms
 - Largest number of organisms including many Select Agent GMOs
 - Least stringent training requirements
 - None - no training programs in biosecurity for BSL-2 laboratories – the training laboratories for BSL-3/4 personnel.



Non Compliance in a Regulated Setting

- ▶ Clinical and Emergency Response
 - Outbreaks and Emerging Infectious Disease
 - 15%-40% transmission to health care workers
 - 40% positive tuberculin skin test vs. 5% US population
- ▶ Non Compliance
 - Compliance with control methods among health care workers is the major obstacle to preventing transmission.
 - 50% non compliance among health workers with hand washing
 - 23% of inner city health care workers are not vaccinated for HBV

Sepkowitz, Ann Int Med, Part I and II 1996



Historical Analysis of Laboratory Acquired Infections

1880's	1930-1978	1979-2004	2000-2007
Typhoid	<i>Brucella spp.</i>	<i>Brucella spp.</i>	<i>Brucella spp.</i>
Tetanus	<i>Coxiella burnetii</i>	<i>Coxiella burnetii</i>	Hepatitis virus
Cholera	Hepatitis B virus	Hepatitis B virus	Hantavirus
<i>Brucella</i>	Herpes B virus	Arbovirus	<i>B. mallei</i>
Glanders	<i>F. tularensis</i>	Hantavirus	Sabia virus
Diphtheria	<i>M. Tuberculosis</i>	<i>M. Tuberculosis</i>	SARS virus
	<i>Coccidioides immitis</i>	<i>Salmonella spp.</i>	West Nile Virus
	VEE Virus	<i>Shigella spp.</i>	<i>E. coli</i> 0157:H7
	<i>Chlamydia psittaci</i>	<i>N. meningitidis</i>	<i>S. aureus</i>
			Vacinia Virus
			VEE Virus
			AI virus
			Ebola virus



Frontline in the War on Terrorism Bioterrorism in Clinical Laboratories

▶ First Response

- First responders to a terrorist attack
 - All clinical labs operate under exemption to the Select Agent Rule
- Vaccination of health care workers with Small Pox vaccine

▶ 1990's Case Report

- Infection of 6 dental patients by HIV + dentist



Problem and Solution

▶ Problem

- Current practice of connecting biosecurity program development to BSL-3 – BSL-4 biosafety levels leaves gaps in training and hinders the development of proficiency indicators in biosecurity.

▶ Challenge

- Define individual proficiency in biosecurity and measure success in a biosecurity program.

▶ Suggested Solution

- Define biosecurity needs by working practices using standardized documents assigning proficiency indicators to the biosecurity task.



Summary and Conclusion

- ▶ BSL-2 laboratories are the foundation of a strong biosecurity program.
 - While not as great as the risks posed by biological material handled at BSL-3/4, biological materials handled in BSL-2 laboratories pose significant risks to health, safety and to the environment.
 - Laboratories following BSL-2 criteria account for the majority of research and clinical labs; however, working practices in many of these laboratories are not standardized or well-documented.
 - Establishing guidelines and standards in biosecurity for BSL-2 laboratories will build proficiency in the biosecurity network throughout a facility and establish a culture of biosecurity in all biological research laboratories.



Biosafety Competency Training and Proficiency Testing

- ▶ Case Study




Defining Competency and Proficiency

- ▶ Competency and proficiency can be assessed using published standards as the basis of the training program.
 - Competency : Capable of completion of a task under specified conditions
 - Proficiency: Expert with knowledge, skill and ability to troubleshoot problems with completion of a task



ADDIE Model



Training Analysis and Performance Metrics

Skill	Task	Subtask	Performance Metric	Evaluation
ELISA	Perform a series of 1:5 dilutions	Selects the correct pipettor for the volume	Selects 200 µl pipettor	Exam or Demonstration
		Accurately measures 120 µl of liquid	± 2 µl accuracy	Demonstration



Customization of Training to the Facility

▶ Task Lists

- Foundation of training materials derived from national and international guidelines and facility SOPs
- Template Task List
 - List of approximately 400 tasks in biosafety to be completed by all personnel in a research laboratory
 - Based on BMBL but does not include facility-specific SOPs



Expanding the number and type of Biosafety Instructors

Certificate	Training Responsibility
Biosafety Instructor	Proficiency Testing
Laboratory Trainer	Competency Training



Documents Defining Working Practices in a Biosecurity Program

Procedural Documents	Biosafety Bioethics	Quality	Biosecurity	Incident Response
Standard Operating Procedures	BMBL 5 th ed	CWA 15793		National Incident Management
Biosafety Manual	WHO Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines	Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute	WHO/CDS/EPR 2006.6	National Response Framework
Equipment Manuals	OSHA BBP Std 29 CFR 1910.1030	ISO/ETC 17025, 1999	SAR 7 CFR 331	WHO IHR
	CDC Infection Control Guidelines	ISO/ETC 15189, 2003	9 CFR 121	
	NIH Guidelines		42 CFR 73	



Summary

- ▶ Most laboratory workers in BSL-2 labs are not subject to stringent training or documentation requirements. This fact is highlighted by the large number of infections resulting from non-compliance with guidelines and regulations.
- ▶ Training aimed at improving working practices can decrease biosecurity risks in BSL-2 labs by increasing worker awareness of biosecurity risks and by increasing the transparency of laboratory work will help close gaps in biosecurity programs.
- ▶ Worker competency and proficiency are two important components of a biosecurity program, which can be assessed and improved through training that is initiated upon entry into the training or clinical laboratory (BSL-2 programs).



Conclusion – Impact on Biosecurity

- ▶ Cooperative culture of safety and security
 - The ISD methodology adapted to biosecurity requires buy-in from laboratory managers and encourages a cooperative interaction between safety and security managers and scientists.
- ▶ Performance indicator for personal reliability
 - BSL-2 laboratories “seed” higher containment facilities. This method provides a step-wise path toward proficiency in biosafety and biosecurity in high containment laboratories.



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