



# National Guard Civil Support Teams as Partners for Select Agent Security and Emergency Response Drills

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## **Emergency Response Drills**

- For U.S. entities with Select Agents, regulations require annual drills to test security, biosafety and emergency procedures.
- OSU recent CDC inspection concerns:
  - Previous drills mostly tabletop exercises or orientations for emergency responders.
  - Question of meeting intent of regulations

# Inception: Joint Exercise


- Approached by an officer in the ORNG 102<sup>nd</sup> CST about conducting a drill at OSU containment lab.
- Decided on a joint exercise; EH&S and CST
- Began planning in fall 2009; Exercise held February 2010.

## Planning Phase

- Perception: Concern about visibility of military activity attracting attention of public, causing rumors.
  - Ran a series of announcements about planned exercise.
- Working lab, disruption of research.
  - Arranged use of building between experiments to avoid disruption.
- Scenario development
  - Worked with outside contractor on scenario development, creating props.
  - Working with a contractor is not the norm, scenario development and set up is usually conducted internally

## **Civil Support Teams**

- Created by Presidential Directive to provide response to chemical, biological or radiological incidents
- 57 teams currently each state / territory now has at least one team
- Both Army and Air National Guard members, controlled by the state Governor
- Subject matter experts, full time personnel with expertise in assessment, monitoring, medicine, science, and communication
- No cost associated with use (real world or training)



#### Mission of CSTs

- CST is to support civil authorities at domestic CBRNE (chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear, enhanced explosive) incident sites by:
  - identifying CBRNE agents and substances
  - assessing current and projected consequences
  - advising on response measures,
  - assisting with appropriate requests for additional support.
  - This includes incidents involving the intentional or unintentional release of CBRBE and natural or man-made disasters that result or could result in the catastrophic loss of life or property in the United States.

#### ONG 102<sup>nd</sup> WMD – CST

- Based in Salem, Oregon about 40 miles from OSU
- Organized into sections, each with defined roles in response and analysis:
  - Incident Tracking and Operations
  - Communications
  - Survey site analysis, entry and sample collection
  - Medical analytical laboratory, medical support
  - Decontamination limited personnel decontamination

# Scenario Development

 Utilized one of two OSU BSL-3 laboratory buildings.



- Staged labs with props to appear that illicit work involving Select Agents was in progress by unknown persons.
- Outside calls organized to give appearance of medical cases flooding local hospitals and clinics.

## **Incident Commander Objectives**

- Life safety
- Site characterization
- Hazard identification via sample collection
- Determine possible exposures and/or cases
- Mitigate threats
- Advise on public health protection measures

## Sequence of Events

- 0700: OSU EH&S responded to report of suspicious activity in BSL-3 building.
  - Called in Oregon State Police, 102<sup>nd</sup> CST
- 0800 0920: OSP, 102<sup>nd</sup> CST responded to scene.
  - As per OSU SA Emergency Response Plan, OSP assumed Incident Command with EH&S and 102<sup>nd</sup> CST in supporting roles (simulated IC).



Initial briefing by IC

#### **Initial Site Activities**

 Survey team assessed site for chemical / radiological hazards; established zones





#### **Initial Site Activities**

 CST Operations / EH&S established staging areas upwind and outside hot zone







#### **Initial Site Activities**

 Decon and Medical teams set up personnel decontamination line / medical monitoring at edge of hot zone



# Modeling and Briefings

 OSU EH&S – led briefing: agents present, routes of exposure, facility entry policies



# Modeling and Briefings

- CST Incident Tracking / Operations used weather conditions, other data to model worst case scenarios for release of agents.
- Supported briefings
- Enhanced decision making



# First Entry

 Joint first entry to building for survey / assessment /data collection by EH&S ,CST





Post – entry decontamination and medical evaluation

# First Entry


- Team carried live camera that recorded and transmitted data to command post, also took digital still photos.
- Data analyzed by science officer, others.
- Briefing held to communicate assessment.



# Second Entry Planning

- Data from first entry was used to prioritize a set of samples to be collected by second entry team.
  - biological samples, documents, photographs





# Second Entry

 Joint entry by EH&S and CST Survey to collect samples, take instrument readings for on-site

analysis.





## Second Entry: Sample Collection

- Samples collected / triple bagged using FBI's 12 step sampling and evidence preservation procedures
- Samples are split for confirmatory analysis at the State Lab



## **Analytical Laboratory System**

• Samples collected during 2<sup>nd</sup> entry were analyzed on-site in mobile laboratory.



# **Analytical Laboratory System**

- Capabilities
  - Class III BSC for sample prep / extraction.
  - Bacteria, viral, toxin identification
    30 minutes 2 hours
  - Biological Analysis
    - Epifluorescence Microscopy
    - Electrochemiluminescence
      - Antigen/antibody binding
    - PCR
      - Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System (JBAIDS)
      - Multiple plasmid and DNA targets
      - RT-PCR





# Pathogen Identification Capabilities

- Pathogen Identification (presumptive)
- Bacillus anthracis
- Clostridium botulinum toxin
- Yersinia pestis
- variola major
- Francisella tularensis
- Brucella species
- Salmonella species
- Burkholeria mallei
- Burkholderia pseudomallei
- Rincinus communis
- Staphylococcal enterotoxin B
- Viral encephalitis
- Others available if specifically requested



#### Presumptive Analysis and Closure

- Sample analysis lead to presumptive identity of agents
- Objectives of Incident Commander met
- OSP maintain control of site pending arrival of FBI
- CST and EH&S continues on site to provide advice and reach-back capabilities as needed.
- Exercise concluded at 2030.

#### **Lessons Learned**

- by OSU EH&S:
  - systematic approach to incident response;
     opportunity to learn from highly trained and well equipped responders
  - familiarity with CST capabilities
  - importance of communication during incidents
- by 102<sup>nd</sup> CST:
  - opportunity to train in actual working containment laboratory setting

#### Conclusions

- Civil Support Teams have capabilities and training that make them important response partners to Select Agent incidents.
- Mutual benefit can be gained by conducting joint exercises involving Select Agent entities and CSTs and other emergency responders.