Safely Handling
Samples of Unknown
Origin & Samples of
Combination
Biological, Chemical &
Radiological Hazard in
Public Health
Laboratories

American Biological Safety
Association
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HDR, Inc.

- Employee-owned Architecture,
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
State Hygienic Laboratory at the

- University of lowaTwo Locations
 - - Coralville, Iowa -160 employees
 - Ankeny, Iowa 60 employees
 - Key Capabilities:
 - Bacteriology
 - Virology
 - Rabies
 - Parasitology
 - Mycobacteriology
 - Immunology / Serology
 - Newborn Screening
 - Biological Threat Preparedness
 - Chemical Threat Preparedness
 - Food-borne Outbreak & Response
 - Radiochemistry
 - Air Quality
 - Limnology
 - Environmental Chemistry (Organic, Inorganic, Pesticide Formulation)
 - Asbestos Testing
 - New Coralville Laboratory Building Completed in October 2010










Historical Events

- 1984 First modern Bio-terror attack in the United States. The Rajneeshee, a cult, spread salmonella bacteria over salad bars at restaurants in Oregon.
- March 1995 Tokyo Subway Sarin gas attack by Aum Shinrikyo cult
- October 2001 Investigation by Department of Justice of letters containing anthrax sent through US Mail named, "Amerithrax"
 - Resulted in 5 Deaths and 17 illnesses.








Local Events

- Tularemia
- Rabies
- SARS
- West Nile Virus
- H1N1 Influenza
- Food-borne Outbreaks







Theoretical Scenarios

- Dirty Bomb
- Deliberate Chemical Release
- Deliberate Biological Release
- Contamination of the Water Supply
- Food Contamination
- Environmental Contamination





"It's perfectly safe. If there's the tiniest leak, a siren goes off—a very, very loud siren—and everyone just evacuates the state."





Organization Who is Involved?








 Laboratory Response Network (LRN)
 Founded by the CDC in1999 in
 collaboration with APHL & FBI

> LRN-B (Biological) - Currently 170 state and local public health, military, international, veterinary, agriculture, food and water testing


 Laboratory Response Network for Chemical Terrorism Preparedness (LRN-C) Laboratories



- EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency
- Environmental Response Laboratory Network (ERLN)
 - ERLN Mission: Provide known laboratory capabilities, capacities, and quality data during nationally significant incidents.
 - ERLN Members include laboratories with analytical capabilities and capacity in the event of natural, intentional and unintentional water contamination.
 - ERLN members include:
 - Local & State Public Health
 Laboratories
 - Colleges/Universities
 - Commercial
 - EPA
 - Government Owned, Contractor Operated
 - Public Utilities







 The Food Emergency Response Network (FERN) integrates the nation's food-testing laboratories at the local, state, and federal levels into a network that is able to respond to emergencies involving biological, chemical, or radiological contamination of food.
 The FERN structure is organized to ensure federal and state inter-agency participation and cooperation in the formation, development, and operation of the network.



FERN laboratories include: State and Local Public Health Agriculture Environmental Veterinary Diagnostic





All Hazards Receiving Facilities

- All Hazards Receipt Facilities
 - Prototypes in NY and Boston
- All Hazards Receipt Facility **Screening Protocol**
 - Initial Survey and Assessment
 - Container Screening
 - Direct Screening
 - Shipment to Receiving Laboratory
- Collaboration of US Department of Homeland Security, USEPA and Association of Public Health Laboratories
- Algorithm and Guidelines for Responding to an Incident Involving a Suspicious Non-Clinical Sample -**APHL**










Routine Sample Accessioning

- Samples of Known Origin
- Centralized Receiving
- Outer Packaging Removed
- Sample Integrity Verified
- Barcode Applied
- Data Entry into LIMS
- Delivery to Labs for Testing









Unknowns Accessioning

- 24 Hour 365 Day Capability
- Samples of Unknown Origin
- Potential Combination Hazard Samples
- Incident Response Capacity
- Surge Capacity for Sample Receiving During Outbreak Response








Facility Features

- Primary Containment Device(s)
- Monolithic Floor, Walls & Ceiling
- Sample Storage
- Supply Storage
- Decontamination Capability
- Gowning / Shower Area
- Windows for Safety and Observation







Equipment Considerations

- Class III Biological Safety Cabinet
- Floor Mounted Fume Hood
- X-ray Screening Equipment
- Explosion Containment Device
- Autoclave
- Hands Free Sink
- Emergency Eyewash







Engineering Systems

- Back-up Power
- HEPA Filtration
- HEGA / TEDA Filtration
- Dedicated Exhaust Fans
- Isolation Dampers
- Directional Airflow Indicators
- Liquid Effluent Decontamination








How are Unknowns Accessioning Facilities Organized?

- Key Design Elements
 - 1. Loading Dock
 - 2. Central Accessioning
 - 3. Unknowns Accessioning
 - 4. Storage
 - 5. Specimen Elevator








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






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






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Sample Flow

What Happens to an Unknown Sample?

Initial Sample Flow

Administrative Decision to Accept



- Proper Packaging
- Complete Documentation
- Field Screening results

Sample Preservation

- Photo documentation
- Chain of custody





All Hazard Sample Flow

 BT Agents PCR Screening Biological Ricin Toxin Culture • FTIR **Preliminary Screening/** Solubility Split Sample Chemical Colorimetric • GCMS Metals Gamma Spectroscopy Radiological Alpha Spectroscopy • Liquid Scintillation Counting






Radiological Sample Flow

- 1. Accessioning
- 2. If acceptable level transfer to testing laboratory
- 3. If levels exceed license isolate








Biological Sample Flow

- 1. Unknowns Accessioning
- 2. Split sampling
- Transfer to BSL3








Chemical Sample Flow

- 1. Unknowns Accessioning
- 2. Split sampling
- 3. Transfer to BSL3
- 4. Initiate testing after biological is complete







Questions?



