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Of Men, Birds, Pigs and...Flu

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REGIONAL COLLEGE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE



Influenza types

Type A	Potentially severe illness Epidemics and pandemics Rapidly changing
Type B	Usually less severe illness Epidemics More uniform
Type C	Usually mild or asymptomatic illness Minimal public health impact




Influenza A virus


✦ Family: *Orthomyxoviridae*

8 Segments of negative sense single stranded RNA

www.cdc.gov




NS1, PB1-F2
Infected cells




Hemagglutinin

HA $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \alpha 2-6\text{Gal} \text{ 🧑} \\ \alpha 2-3\text{Gal} \text{ 🦢} \end{array} \right.$




Neuraminidase

NA



M2 Ion Channel

M2



RNP

PB1, PB2, PA


NP

vRNA



} vRNP

A change in receptor specificity is thought to favor host switching of influenza A viruses

SA α 2,3-Gal



SA α 2,6-Gal




Sialic acid
(N-acetyl neuraminic acid)




Type A influenza
cannot be eradicated

16 HA subtypes
9 NA subtypes




Reassortment is how Flu has SEX!!



Influenza “Transmissible”: molecular signatures that allow the virus to replicate throughout the host’s respiratory tract and lead to respiratory droplet transmission

A transmissible Influenza Virus is likely to require:

- Binding to SA α 2,6-Gal receptors
- Balanced HA and NA (and M2?) activities
- Efficient Replication in Upper and Lower Respiratory Tract





Influenza in domestic birds

Defined as fowl plague in 1878.


Significant economic losses.

Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses – LPAIV

- Associated with outbreaks of varying intensity in domestic birds.
- Progenitors of ...
 - **Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses - HPAIV**
 - H5 and H7 subtypes.
 - Accumulation of basic amino acids at the HA cleavage site.
 - ~26 outbreaks since 1959, 13 since 1990
 - ~13 H7 subtype, ~13 H5 subtype



Number of human cases and deaths due to H5N1 infections/country since 1997




608 cases /
359 deaths

cases
deaths


H5N1 infections



Number of cases and deaths due to H7 infections



Number of cases and deaths due to H9 infections



Seroprevalence of H9N2 in humans

Region	Population	% Sero- prevalence	Citation
Xinjiang, CH	General (64% poultry exposure)	1.7	Jia et al. 2009, <i>J Clin Vir</i>
Liaoning, CH	General (67% poultry exposure)	1	Jia et al. 2009, <i>J of Clin Vir</i>
Guangzhou, CH	Poultry workers	3-15	Wang et al. 2009, <i>NEJM</i>
Iran	General	2.5	Hadipour and Pazira 2011, <i>J An Vet Adv.</i>


- 1-4% seroprevalence in the general public in China
 - Only used single antigenic strain, may be higher
- 9-15% in poultry workers in Guangdong Province
- **Cross-reaction with H2N2 antibodies or other human influenza viruses??**



Overview of H9N2 avian influenza viruses

A/guinea fowl/Hong Kong/WF10/99 (H9N2) - RGWF10

Nature



Before 1988

Laboratory

Early isolates do not or replicate poorly (1997 and before)

After 1988-1994



Recent field isolates replicate well (1998 and later)

Bind preferentially to human-like sialic acid receptors



H9N2 geographic range


H9N2 avian influenza viruses of the G1-like lineage show the largest geographic spread

H9 influenza viruses go where H5N1 viruses go!

Previous pandemic influenza viruses have not been associated with major disease outbreaks in birds



Contemporary H9N2 avian influenza viruses with human-like receptor specificity (L226) infect mostly nonciliated cells in HAE cultures.



Collaborator: James Stevens,
CDC



Wan & Perez, JVI 2007




Ferrets recapitulate human infection with Influenza A viruses



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


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


Laboratory Droplet
Contact





Efficient direct- but not aerosol-transmission of a H9N2 isolate with human virus-like receptor specificity in ferrets



Would an avian/human H9N2 reassortant virus show improved replication and transmission in ferrets?

RGMemphis98




RGWF10 (L226)





2WF10:6M98



Plaque morphology cannot be used as a marker of pathogenesis/transmissibility




Efficient direct- but not aerosol-transmission of the avian/human 2WF10:6M98 (H9N2) virus in ferrets




Trachea


mWF10 (Q226)



RGWF10 (L226)






2WF10:6M98



The 2WF10:6M98 (H9N2) shows increased virulence in ferrets compared to the wt WF10

Lungs


mWF10 (Q226)



Is it possible to generate a H9N2 virus that transmits by aerosol in ferrets? - Implications for pandemic preparedness

2WF10:6M98

Passage 1






Adaptation of an avian/human H9N2 virus in ferrets leads to a strain that can transmit by respiratory droplets

Nasal washes used to infect new set of ferrets

P10-2WF10:6M98

Passage 10




Gene	Origin	Amino Acid Position	Parent	P8	P9	P10	RCP10	RCP10 ₂
PB2	Human	374	L	I	I	I	I	I
PB1	Human	No changes ^a		nd ^b	nd			
PA	Human	No changes		nd	nd			
HA	Avian	HA1 189	T	T	T	T	A	A
		HA2 192	G	G	G/R^c	G/R^c	R	R
NP	Human	No changes		nd	nd			
NA	Avian	28	I	V	V	V	V	V
M1	Human	110	H	H/Y^c	Y	Y	Y	Y
M2	Human	No changes		nd	nd			
NS1	Human	No changes		nd	nd			
NEP	Human	No changes		nd	nd			

Five amino acid changes occurred during adaptation of the 2WF10:6M98 virus in ferrets

^a No amino acid changes detected between the parent and either the RCP10 or the RCP10₂ viruses. ^b nd, sequencing not done. ^c Bold and italicized letter denotes more prominent residue at particular amino acid position based on electropherograms of sequencing profiles.



Mock WF10 2WF10:6M98 P10





The P10 and 2WF10:6M98 viruses show improved LRT replication in ferrets compared to the wt WF10



The P10-2WF10:6M98 (H9N2) virus shows consistent aerosol transmission in ferrets



P10-2WF10:6M98

Round 1






P10-2WF10:6M98

Round 2





The P10-2WF10:6M98 (H9N2) virus shows consistent aerosol transmission in ferrets




RCP10 (A189,G192)



RCP10 (T189,R192)



2WF10:6RCP10



Position T189A: RBS and antigenic profile

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Microbiology


Minimal molecular constraints for respiratory droplet transmission of an avian–human H9N2 influenza A virus

Erin M. Sorrell,¹ Hongquan Wan,^{1,2} Yonas Araya, Haichen Song,³ and Daniel R. Perez⁴

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Edited by Peter Palese, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York, NY, and approved March 17, 2009

Contributed by
Author contributions: D.R.P. designed research; E.M.S., H.W., Y.A., and H.S. performed research; E.M.S., H.W., H.S., and D.R.P. analyzed data; and E.M.S., H.W., and D.R.P. wrote the paper.
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the tip of the HA protein,
cial for respiratory
ssion

Alanine


Compatibility of H9N2 avian influenza surface genes and 2009 pandemic H1N1 internal genes for transmission in the ferret model

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PNAS




Epidemiology of SIVs in North America since 1918



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Published online 2010 October 14. doi: [10.1371/journal.ppat.1001145](https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1001145). PMID: PMC2954835

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Variations in the Hemagglutinin of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Virus: Potential for Strains with Altered Virulence Phenotype?

Jianqiang Ye,^{1,2} Erin M. Sorrell,^{1,2} Yibin Cai,^{1,2} Hongxia Shao,^{1,2} Kemin Xu,^{1,2} Lindomar Pena,^{1,2} Danielle Hickman,^{1,2} Haichen Song,³ Matthew Angel,^{1,2} Rafael A. Medina,^{4,5,6} Balaji Manicassamy,^{4,5,6} Adolfo Garcia-Sastre,^{4,5,6} and Daniel R. Perez^{1,2*}


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doi: [10.1371/currents.RRN1011](https://doi.org/10.1371/currents.RRN1011). Other versions

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Influenza

Fitness of Pandemic H1N1 and Seasonal influenza A viruses during Co-infection

Evidence of competitive advantage of pandemic H1N1 influenza versus seasonal influenza

Daniel Roberto Perez,^{*} Erin Sorrell,[†] Matthew Angel,[‡] Jianqiang Ye, Danielle Hickman,^{*} Lindomar Pena,[¶] Gloria Ramirez-Nieto,[#] Brian Kimble,[†] and Yonas Araya[†]

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Accepted August 25, 2009.


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
 Top Pick Knol Award



How does the 2009 Pandemic change how we view H9s?



1P10 (H9N1)




2P10 (H9N2)



1WF10 (H9N1)



2WF10 (H9N2)







■ A/Netherlands/602/09 (H1N1)

■ A/Guinea Fowl/Hong Kong/WF10/99 (H9N2)

■ A/Ferret/Maryland/P10-UMD/08 (H9N2)



H9N2:H1N1pdm reassortants can be transmitted by respiratory droplets in ferrets



Summary H9N2 viruses – Risk Assessment

Contemporary H9N2 avian influenza viruses with human-like receptor specificity infect mostly nonciliated cells in cultures of human airway epithelium (HAE).

L226 containing H9N2 viruses show efficient direct - but not aerosol - transmission in ferrets. No signs of disease.

An avian/human H9N2 reassortant shows improved replication in ferrets with no detectable respiratory droplet transmission.

Respiratory droplet transmission in ferrets of an avian/human H9N2 virus requires few amino acid changes with major implications in replication, virulence and antibody recognition profiling.

H9 HA in the context of N2 or N1 NA is compatible with respiratory transmission when the internal genes are derived from the H1N1pdm virus.



LETTER

doi:10.1038/nature10831

Experimental adaptation of an influenza H5 HA confers respiratory droplet transmission to a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets

Masaki Imai¹, Tokiko Watanabe^{1,2}, Masato Hatta¹, Subash C. Das¹, Makoto Ozawa^{1,3}, Kyoko Shinya⁴, Gongxun Zhong¹, Anthony Hanson¹, Hiroaki Katsura⁵, Shinji Watanabe^{1,2}, Chengjun Li¹, Eiryō Kawakami², Shinya Yamada³, Maki Kiso³, Yasuo Suzuki⁶, Eileen A. Maher¹, Gabriele Neumann¹ & Yoshihiro Kawaoka^{1,2,3,5}

H5N1

Science **336**, 1534 (2012);
DOI: 10.1126/science.1213362

REPORT

Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus Between Ferrets

Sander Herfst¹, Eefje J. A. Schrauwen¹, Martin Linster¹, Salin Chutinimitkul¹, Emmie de Wit^{1,*}, Vincent J. Munster^{1,*}, Erin M. Sorrell¹, Theo M. Bestebroer¹, David F. Burke², Derek J. Smith^{1,2,3}, Guus F. Rimmelzwaan¹, Albert D. M. E. Osterhaus¹, Ron A. M. Fouchier^{1†}




Transmissible H5N1 viruses: Chronology of events


- September 2011, **Prof. Ron Fouchier** of the **Erasmus Medical Center** (Rotterdam, Netherlands) reported at a public scientific meeting the results of genetically modifying influenza A (H5N1) viruses transmissible through the air between ferrets.
- Similar research at the **University of Wisconsin-Madison**, USA under **Dr. Yoshihiro Kawaoka** except that the transmissible viruses are reportedly not lethal to ferrets.
- Manuscripts submitted to the journals **Science** and **Nature**, respectively...
 - Both sets of studies funded by the **US National Institutes of Health (NIH)** and came under review by the **U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB)** prior to publication.




Localization of amino acid changes identified in this study on the three-dimensional structure of the monomer of VN1203 HA (Protein Data Bank accession 2FK0)¹⁵.



Serial passaging in ferrets - Sequence analysis -



H103: forms part of the trimer interface



T156: part of a N-linked glycosylation sequon

A DEPARTMENT OF **Erasmus MC**



Transmissible H5N1 viruses: Interlocking issues

- *A voluntary moratorium on the research has been declared by the groups capable of undertaking such research. (Still in effect)*
- Public concern that laboratory-modified H5N1 viruses could accidentally cause an influenza pandemic;
- The need for assessment of the balance of public health risk and benefit in research;
- Appropriate laboratory biosafety requirements of research on the evolution of pathogens to become more virulent or transmissible;
- The need and ability to revise risk assessments concerning H5N1 viruses;
- A potential threat to the new pandemic influenza preparedness framework for influenza virus and benefit sharing;
- and academic freedom to publish.



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- *“Current epidemiologic evidence indicates that, once transmitted into a human host, H5N1 viruses may result in more severe disease in humans than other subtypes of influenza.”*

- *“Listing influenza viruses that contain an HA from the goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage as an HHS select agent will ensure that the focus of regulation will also be on the potential impact of these viruses on human health as well as agriculture.”*

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- *“Designating HPAI containing an HA from the Goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage an HHS select agent, in addition to its status as a USDA select agent, may help to ensure that HPAI strains that have the greatest potential for major direct effects on human health will be regulated with a focus on protection of human health.”*



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- The HHS/CDC's Intragovernmental Select Agents and Toxins Technical Advisory Committee (ISATTAC) recognized ...
 - **That study of the Goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage-derived viruses could lead to significant public health benefits for understanding pandemic influenza, improved diagnostics, and the development of more effective countermeasures.**
 - **Therefore, the risks posed by these viruses need to be weighed against any adverse impact that a regulation will have on legitimate research.**



Federal Register /Vol. 77, No. 201 /Wednesday, October 17, 2012 / Proposed Rules – Tier 1

- Establishment of a Docket and Request for Specific Input on Certain Topics
 - **Should special precautions (i.e., safety and containment measures) be considered when working with strains of HPAI containing the HA from the Goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage that have been shown to be transmissible between mammals beyond those recommended for non-mammalian transmissible HPAI?**



HPAI H5N1 transmission - Will such virus emerge in nature?

www.sciencemag.org SCIENCE VOL 336 22 JUNE 2012

REPORT

The Potential for Respiratory Droplet–Transmissible A/H5N1 Influenza Virus to Evolve in a Mammalian Host

Colin A. Russell,^{1,2,3} Judith M. Fonville,^{1,2} André E. X. Brown,⁴ David F. Burke,^{1,2} David L. Smith,^{3,5,6} Sarah L. James,^{1,2} Sander Herfst,⁷ Sander van Boheemen,⁷ Martin Linster,⁷ Eefje J. Schrauwen,⁷ Leah Katzelnick,^{1,2} Ana Mosterín,^{1,2,8} Thijs Kuiken,⁷ Eileen Maher,⁹ Gabriele Neumann,⁹ Albert D. M. E. Osterhaus,⁷ Yoshihiro Kawaoka,^{9,10,11,12} Ron A. M. Fouchier,⁷ Derek J. Smith^{1,2,3,7*}



Asia - avian

Africa and Middle East - avian


Herfst *et al* set
Number of nucleotide mutations in HA necessary for aerosol transmission

3 mutations
4 mutations
5 mutations

Mostly from Egypt
(have E627K)

Japan, Mongolia, Nepal 2009-2011
(do not have E627K)

Russell *et al.*, Science (2012)



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Erasmus Medical Center, The Netherlands
Ron Fouchier

NIH NIAID
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