
Simon Wain-Hobson Institut Pasteur Paris

Chair Foundation for Vaccine Research Washington DC


ABSA Kansas City




Every influenza virus is in a duck or shore bird




Pandemic influenza virus are but three



Sporadic influenza virus are few but...



... most go nowhere - dead end infections



Dead end infections are all around us

Rabies

55 000 deaths per year


Nipah and Hendraviruses

MERS coronavirus

LCMV

Pulmonary hantaviruses

Simian retroviruses (Foamy, STLV, SIV)





HIV-2 SIVagm





How?





How?



~15% SIV positive



How?






~15% SIV positive

Evidence for continuing cross-species transmission of SIVsmm to humans: characterization of a new HIV-2 lineage in rural Côte d'Ivoire Ahidjo *et al.*, AIDS 27, 2488 (2013)

We mustn't confuse reality & novelty

Dead end infections	Next to no transmission. Can be highly pathogenic Rabies 55K (case fatality rate CFR>95%) H5N1 < 700 cases in 16 years MERS coronavirus HIV-1 N, P
Outbreaks	Transmissible yet limited chains SARS coronaviruses Some HIVs, Ebola (CFR~70%) coxsackie-poliovirus recombinants HIV-1 O, HIV-2
Epidemics	Common cold viruses, enteroviruses
Pandemics	Very rare Flu, HIV-1 M

Gain-of-function (GOF) research means **deliberately** transforming avian influenza viruses that are not transmissible between mammals into viruses that are capable of efficient transmission





infected donor ferret

air flow

receiver ferret


The pro-GOF group says that it will help prepare for a pandemic while the risks can be mitigated and contained

Useful for:

- Vaccine development
- Drug design
- Pandemic preparedness
- Interpreting naturally arising mutations in the field

The anti-GOF group says there is nothing in the research to help a Health Minister make robust decisions

• A selection screen will come up with what you select for



Selective screens - you get what you select for



Less than 50 years was enough



Dmitri Belyaev selected Siberian silver foxes for reduced fear of humans

Lower adrenaline in serum The anti-GOF group says there is nothing in the research to help a Health Minister make robust decisions


• Vaccines No way!

Adel Mahmoud former President of Merck Vaccines This week's issue of Science

Presently many clades of H5N1 circulating Which will make it big time?

H5N1 GOF viruses of Asian origin are "old" Chen 2001, Fouchier 2005, Kawaoka 2004

Don't know which antigenicaly different strain will jump



The anti-GOF group says there is nothing in the research to help a Health Minister make robust decisions

• Drug design

Can only hope that the next pandemic virus is drug sensitive

 Pandemic prediction and preparedness
 We missed H1N1 from Central America H7N9 came out of the blue, as did the SARS and MERS coronaviruses

> Stockpiling of drugs - obvious Stockpiling of vaccines – less obvious

The anti-GOF group says there is nothing in the research to help a Health Minister make robust decisions


• Interpreting mutations in the field


The data can be obtained by testing individual mutations in a gene or reference virus but not in transmission studies


Saturation mutagenesis of the receptor pocket in the HA gene

Exhaustive analysis of rare human to human transmission cases which do exist


Fouchier or Kawaoka mutations in Asian strains do NOT confer growth on human cells for 2009 Egyptian H5N1 strains







H7N9 – just one mutation away




human receptor

Tharakaraman et al., Cell 153, 1486 (2013)

H7N9 – just one mutation away

- H7 G228S mutant binds apical surface of trachea, submucosal gland and goblet cells
- Just like other human adapted influenza A viruses

Tharakaraman *et al.*, Cell 153, 1486



 Many virologists feel that in nature pathogenesis (case fatality rate, CFR) would be "traded in" for increased transmission

- Many virologists feel that in nature pathogenesis (case fatality rate, CFR) would be "traded in" for increased transmission
- However, morbidity, mortality and economic impact is greater for a highly transmissible flu virus with a lower CFR (Verikos *et al.*, 2011)
- H5N1 CFR ~60%
 Spanish flu CFR ~2%
 700 cases
 Most of the world
 infected

 If you select for a HIGHLY pathogenic GOF virus that is highly transmissible among ferrets then you WILL succeed

 If you select for a HIGHLY pathogenic GOF virus that is highly transmissible among ferrets then you WILL succeed

- Smallpox 300-500 M deaths in 20th century
- Variola virus didn't infect most of the world
- Virologists are playing with a biological bomb on a very short fuse



- The potential of these avian influenza GOF viruses can never be assessed because the crucial experiment

 infecting humans – is unethical
- How do you design a pandemic experiment?
- The pro-GOF group can never prove their case they can infer, surmise, project
- There is nothing robust for a Health Minister

• Meanwhile avian influenza GOF work is proceeding

GOF risk – unusually high stakes

- Can mitigate the risks but no system is perfect
- Some risk factors Mechanical failure Earthquake Hurricane Tornado

Human error Overconfidence Disgruntled scientist Weak oversight

- One slip, but of gigantic ramifications
 a man made flu pandemic
- No risk analysis has been published!
- Meanwhile avian influenza GOF work is proceeding

My own opinion – Nature March 2013



risks posed by gain-of-function research, says Simon Wain-Hobson.

sthe

We have no plans to pursue such H7N9 GOF studies

Chen Hualan, Director of China's National Avian Influenza Reference Laboratory in Harbin *Science* August 8, 2013

I think such [avian influenza GOF] experiments should never be repeated. Existing samples should be destroyed

Zeng Guang, Chief epidemiologist Chinese Centre for Disease Control *Handelsblatt* August 8, 2013

No consensus as to the benefits

- There is no *consensus* as to the merits of the science
- Hence the benefits are not presently quantifiable
- There is tremendous tension among virologists
- There has NOT been adequate discussion and debate between stakeholders
- Learned societies, regulators and governments have FAILED to show leadership
- Meanwhile avian influenza GOF work is proceeding

Pragmatic suggestions


• FREEZE

• Need an international conference with all the stakeholders

Virologists, infectious disease clinicians, epidemiologists, biosafety and biosecurity experts, lawyers, ethicists, government officials, university presidents, insurers, military, intelligence services, diplomats, press

- Need a risk & liability analysis
- Need a considered moral opinion
- Need leadership

One open meeting on GOF research



H5N1 research: biosafety,



GΥ

THE BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION

FONDATION MERIEUX

THE GERMAN NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES LEOPOLDINA

INSTITUT PASTEUR

THE SOCIETY FOR GENERAL MICROBIOLOGY



YAL SOCIETY

http://royalsociety.org/events/2012/viruses/

Leadership has been in short supply

- Mainly closed or limited meetings in the US
- Biological Weapons Convention Geneva August 2013
- Dutch National Academy of Science Report pending
- German National Ethics Committee
 Spring 2014
- ASBA October 2013

Biggest issue since the Manhatten project

- This is the Asilomar moment. We are there
- It's about doing robust science
- It's about responsibility in science
- It's about trust in biomedicine

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- This is the Asilomar moment. We are there
- It's about doing robust science
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- It's about trust in biomedicine
- It is NOT about freedom of scientific enquiry
- Meanwhile avian influenza GOF work is proceeding

Our tool box is so powerful that biologists

should have an obligation to do no harm

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InterAcademy Panel statement on biosecurity

• Scientists have an obligation to do no harm

68 Academies

ASBA, we have a problem



ASBA, we have a problem



simon.wain-hobson@pasteur.fr

Meanwhile avian influenza GOF work is proceeding

Selective screens - you get what you select for



Would nature have come up with any of these?

H5N1 & H7N9 GOF research

- Functional sequence space is so huge that there are many ways to be a successful virus
- Unlikely that these studies will come up with a single solution if performed 10 times
- Fouchier or Kawaoka mutations in 2009 Egyptian H5N1 strains don't confer growth on human cells
- Chen virus dates from 2001, Fouchier virus 2004, Kawaoka virus 2005

Publish it, publish it not

- Major theme of early NSABB discussions involved Nature and Science
- Papers were already in the cloud thanks to email and uploading to Nature and Science web sites!
- Discussion was unbelievably cloud naïve
- BP Hanley Security in a goldfish bowl: the NSABB's exacerbation of the bioterrorism threat J Bioterr Biodef 2013

Although we live in a dangerous world

- There are more viruses than cells on the planet
- All species are under threat from tens of viruses
- RNA viruses mutate rapidly (influenza > HIV) can recombine (HIV) or reassort (influenza) massively

Although we live in a dangerous world

- There are more viruses than cells on the planet
- All species are under threat from tens of viruses
- RNA viruses mutate rapidly (influenza > HIV) can recombine (HIV) or reassort (influenza) massively
- The presence of so many species means that in the predator-prey game we do rather well

We are there, and naturally!

- RNA viruses are mutation machines
- A virus stock contains every single point mutation
- The mutant is at a frequency of ~10⁻⁴

