Leadership...and Cultures of Responsibility



David R. Franz

The (Fink) 'Experiments of Concern'

AKA 'The Seven Deadly Sins'

(1) Demonstrating h

(2) **conferring resista** agents,

(3) **enhancing the vi** virulent,

(4) increasing transn

(5) altering the host

(6) enabling the eva-

2003 tive, BIOTECHNOLOGY ntibiotics or antiviral IN AN AGE OF TE ring a non-pathogen bdalities or

(7) **enabling the weaponization** of a biological agent or toxin.

The (Fink) 'Experiments of Concern'

AKA 'The Seven Deadly Sins'

- (1) Demonstrating how to render a vaccine ineffective,
- (2) **conferring resistance** to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents,
- (3) **enhancing the virulence** of a pathogen or rendering a non-pathogen virulent,
- (4) increasing transmissibility of a pathogen,
- (5) altering the host range of a pathogen,
- (6) enabling the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities or
- (7) **enabling the weaponization** of a biological agent or toxin.



And the Eighth...?

Calling it 'Dual-Use RESEARCH of CONCERN...



We were discussing Sustainable Biosafety & Biosecurity Cultures

Biosafety and Biosecurity




A certificate on the wall is NOT good enough...




They've got to be 'in the soup".


It was an engineer from Tunisia in Casablanca who explained it.

Sustainable **Biological Safety** and **Biological Security** Programs in the Global **Networked** Life-Sciences Enterprise




Sustainable **Biological Safety** and **Biological Security** Programs in the Global **Networked** Life-Sciences Enterprise





Sustainable Biological Safety and Biological Security Programs





The *Enterprise*: We are all looking for 'value'

Public Health

d

ovalty Marketing There's not a market for Safety Security doesn't feed hungry children **Patent** Fences around labs don't make vaccines Law A training certificate on the wall is not an endpoint Infrastructure

Innovation

Assessment

Leadership **Cultural Outcomes**

Education

*They must be part of the 'soup'





Leadership **Cultural Outcomes**

Education

Innovation

*They must be part of the 'soup'

We all find ourselves in different situations

Partnering

Ethics

Legal
Framework

Security*

Collaboration

Leadership

Management

Output

Collaboration

Energy

ograms

Agriculture

Public

Health

Food

Some worry only about Survival

"Research occurs where basic needs have been met."

Senior Health Ministry Official, Sierra Leone; Mar 2012

Patent Law



Growth

Education

Honesty

Infrastructure
Leadership
Cultural Outcomes


Responsibility...individual & corporate

Innovation

Environment

*They must be part of the 'soup'

Finance



Cultural Outcomes Education *They must be

*They must be part of the 'soup'

Sustainable Biological Safety and Biological Security Programs

in the Global **Networked** Life-Sciences Enterprise



Others with even more resources will have concerns about energy and the environment



Food

Energy




Education

Infrastructure Leadership **Cultural Outcomes** Responsibility...individual & corporate

Innovation

Environment Finance

*They must be part of the 'soup'



SCIENCE & DIPLOMACY



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Anwar Nasim, et al., "Paths to Biosafety and Biosecurity Sustainability: A Message from the MENA Region," Science & Diplomacy, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 2013"). http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2013/paths-biosafety-and-biosecurity-sustainability.

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*The complete issue will be posted in December 2013.

Paths to Biosafety and Biosecurity Sustainability: A Message from the MENA Region

Anwar Nasim, Nisreen DaifAllah AL-Hmoud, Sabah AlMomin, Najat Rashid, Khalid R. Temsamani, Kavita Berger, and David R. Franz

FOR the past decade, governments seeking biological security have trained personnel and secured pathogens and laboratories at home and abroad;

We Too Often Substitute Regulation for Leadership

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science

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DOI: 10.1089/bsp.2011.0052

It's easier...
but does it make us safer
or more secure?

COMMENTARY

Balancing Our Approach to the Insider Threat

David R. Franz and James W. LeDuc

B IOTERRORISM WAS A CONCERN of some in government even before Al Qaida—manned planes took down the World Trade Center towers. The anthrax letters greatly heightened that concern and extended it to our citizens as well. The nation responded with billions of dollars: biodefense research and development, medical countermea-

noted that the Department of Defense had the most stringent laboratory security regulations, recommended laboratory video cameras in labs rather than a 2-person rule (1 person to watch another scientist at work), encouraged tailoring the Personnel Reliability Programs (PRP) in biological labs to avoid having a negative impact on research,

Leaders influence culture...

Enlightened Leadership

Regulatory Oversight

Lead with Science

Quality Research

Emphasis on Safety

Vision

Education

Responsibility

Accountability

Honesty

Transparency

Ethics

A Culture of Trust

Lead with Security

Guns, Gates and Guards

Background Checks

Psychological Evaluation

Lists & Pathogen Control

A Culture of Mistrust?

Some labs will need some of the right column, but every lab can benefit from the left...

Which will make us safer and more productive?


The Value of Trust

High Trust Organization

- Increased Value
- Accelerated Growth
- Enhanced Innovation
- Improved collaboration
- Stronger Partnering
- Better Execution
- Heightened Loyalty

Low Trust Organization

- Redundancy
- Bureaucracy
- Politics
- Disengagement
- Turnover
- Churn
- Fraud



1-Leadership can make this much difference!

- 2-Are we doing all we can to encourage this kind of leadership?
- 3-Are we doing all we can to develop and maintain high-trust organizations?

An example from industry

1987



The new CEO's briefing for shareholders...

"I want to talk to you about worker safety."



Paul O'Neill


Shareholders wondered why he had omitted to talk about improving profits. Alcoa was in a mess!


"I'm not certain you heard me. If you want to understand how Alcoa is doing, you need to look at our workplace safety figures. If we bring injury rates down, it won't be because of cheerleading or nonsense you sometimes hear from other CEOs. It will be because individuals at this company have agreed to become part of something important... They've devoted themselves to creating a habit of excellence. Safety will be an indicator that we're making progress in changing our habits across the entire institution. That's how we should be judged."

The company's market value increased from \$3 billion in 1986 to \$27.53 billion in 2000, while net income increased from \$200 million to \$1.484 billion.



The legacy of safety lives on





The Power of Safety


O'Neill found something everyone could agree on—worker safety—and harnessed that as a basis for change.

at all levels of an organization

Leaders'influence culture...

Enlightened Leadership

Regulatory Oversight



Accountability

Honesty

Transparency

Ethics

A Culture of Trust

Some labs will need some of the right column, but every lab can benefit from the left...

Which will make us safer and more productive?

The World Needs Us...to be Productive.



Each of us can make a difference...



www.labsafetyleader.com