Commissioning: A Critical Strategy for Risk Management in the BSL-3 Environment

October 5, 2016





ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH & Engineering, inc.

Agenda

- Biosafety Laboratory Principles
- Containment
 - Primary
 - Secondary
- Commissioning Definition
- Containment Strategies
- Case Studies
- Summary

Biosafety Laboratory

- Biosafety Principles

 Containment
 - Microbiological Practices
 - Safety Equipment
 - Facility Safeguards
 - Risk Assessment
 - Process that enables the appropriate selection of containment requirements that can prevent Laboratory Associated Infections (LAI)



Biosafety Laboratory Containment

BSL-3 Key Elements to Ensure Containment

- Primary containment
 - Equipment (biological safety cabinets BSCs)
 - Work practices
- Secondary containment
 - Physical lab construction (architectural)
 - Exhaust redundancy and supply interlock
 - Control schemes
 - Room pressurization
 - Backup power



Risk Assessment

Risk Assessment– Process that enables the appropriate selection of containment requirements that can prevent LAIs.

- Primary factors fall into two broad categories:
 - Agent hazards
 - Lab procedure hazards
- Facility Safeguards
 - Space integrity is crucial
 - Direction airflow (pressurization) requires operational integrity of the HVAC system. HVAC systems require careful monitoring and periodic maintenance to sustain operational integrity.

"The laboratory shall be designed such that under failure conditions the airflow will not be reversed."

– BMBL 5th Edition





Commissioning (Cx)

- Laboratory
 - A systematic review and documentation process signifying that specified laboratory components and <u>systems</u> have been installed, inspected, functionally tested and verified to meet the project design and applicable standards.
- Biosafety Laboratory
 - Verification of the <u>physical construction</u> and <u>performance</u> of <u>critical containment components</u>.

Biosafety Laboratory Cx

BSL-3 System *Performance* = *Containment*

- Performance Criteria
 - Redundant Capacity
 - Response time
 - Controls
 - Failure alarms
 - Pressurization
 - Local and remote measurement devices

Design Phase – Focused Review



Design Phase – Focused Review



Biosafety Lab Construction

CDC BSL 3 Lab Facility Requirements

Yes	No	
\checkmark		Laboratory is separate from public traffic
\checkmark		Access to laboratory is restricted
\checkmark		Entry is through two self-closing doors
\checkmark		Doors are lockable
\checkmark		Automatic or hands-free sink located close to an exit and is designated for hand-washing
\checkmark		Walls, floors and ceilings are constructed for easy cleaning and decontamination
\checkmark		Seams are sealed
\checkmark		Walls, ceilings and floors are smooth, impermeable to liquids and resist chemicals used in the room
\checkmark		Floors are monolithic and slip-resistant
		Penetrations in the room are sealed or are capable of being sealed
\checkmark		Spaces around ducts, between doors and frames are capable of being sealed for decontamination
\checkmark		Bench tops impervious to water
\checkmark		Bench tops resistant to moderate heat
Part	ial list	

NIH BSL 3 Requirements in addition to CDC

Yes No Ventilated airlock designed to separate common corridors from BSL III containment laboratory \square Ceiling has a smooth, sealed finish \square

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Ventilation is single pass air

Laboratory must be kept negative with respect to outside corridors and laboratories

- Supply and exhaust ducts must be supplied with \square gas-tight dampers
- Ductwork between the laboratory and the \square damper is gas-tight
- Access panel supplied that allows access to critical mechanical equipment
- Panel is piano-hinged and gasketed with gas- \square tight gaskets
- All penetrations in laboratory must be sealed \square with a smooth finish
- All joints between fixed cabinetry and the floor or wall must be smooth coved and sealed $\overline{\mathbf{A}}$ \square
- Light fixtures are gasketed or sealed at the point $\mathbf{\nabla}$ of penetration into the laboratory

Partial list.....

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Engineering Control Elements

- Facility Design and Construction (secondary barriers)
 - Specialized ventilation systems to ensure:
 - Direction airflow and pressurization
 - Lab isolation
 - Filtration
 - Air conditioning and heating
 - Air lock at lab entrances

Key Engineering Control Components

- Exhaust fan redundancy
 - Timing goals
- Supply air isolation dampers
- Ducted ventilation system
 - Welded exhaust ductwork
- HEPA Filtration
 - Gas-tight isolation dampers
 - Bag-in/Bag-out capabilities or decontamination ports
 - Filter leak testing capability
 - Annual filter and housing certification
- Pressure monitoring (local and remote)
- Control alarms



Performance (Containment) Testing



Performance (Containment) Testing

3.	Failure Scenarios and Alarming	Date	Crite Pass	ria Fail	Note:					
Α	A Fail operating fan (EF-51 or EF-52) at VFD									
	Note time for backup fan to start: $_20$ sec	10/22/12	\checkmark							
	Observe pressure at 934A, B, and C. Document transient results in detail, e.g., net changes, if wrong way pressure observed, for how long, etc.	10/22/12								
	BSL-3 rooms became very slightly more negative (e.g., from -0.08" to -0.10") briefly, then returned to their original values.									
	Verify BAS alarm for failed fan	10/22/12	\checkmark							
В	B Fail remaining fan (EF-51 or EF-52) at VFD—both units down									
	Observe pressure at 934A, B, and C. Document transient results in detail, e.g., net changes, if wrong way pressure observed, for how long, etc.	10/22/12	V							
	Insignificant change. Magnitude of whole suite negative pressure diminished -0.18" to -0.12".									
	Document resulting pressures across main room boundaries below.	10/22/12	\checkmark							
	Verify BAS alarm for failed fan	10/22/12	\checkmark							

Record Pressure, Full Exhaust Failure



Failure Testing Example





Pressure, Inches Water Column

Pressure Measurements in 5 Second Intervals - BSL-3 Lab

BSL-3 Suite Pressure During Power Outage



Case Study: Redundancy Failure

- Exhaust failure test at the exhaust fan disconnect
 - Failure not registered (no BAS run indication)
 - Failed fan dampers stayed open



Case Study: Erratic Pressure Control

- Space too tight for selected HVAC control systems
 - Standard office type VAV controls installed for cost savings rather than higher end systems
 - > A low end system with ±120 cfm yields ±0.034" fluctuations
 - > A better system with ±40 cfm yields ±0.004" fluctuations

Case Study: Door Force Difficulties

- Emergency purge sequence caused excessive door force
 - Exhaust forced to 100% speed
 - Egress door force limit typ. <30 $\rm lb_{f}$
 - Adjust speed during Cx





Successful BSL-3 Laboratories:

- 1. Primary containment, SOPs, risk assessment and containment plan
- 2. Establish sensible acceptance criteria in keeping with BMBL 5 and established criteria based on risk
- 3. Commissioning as a risk management function provides a methodical path to BSL-3 containment and overall performance

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