Is There a Doctor in the House? The Role of a Medical Officer Integrated into Laboratory Safety Procedures

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Microbiological Health Officer

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My background

- 1991-2001: Research microbiologist DSTL Porton Down
 - Research work and laboratory manager of BSL-3 facilities
- 2001-2005: Medical School
- 2005-2007: Foundation medical training
- 2007-2012: Specialty training: Medical Microbiology and Virology
- 2012: Consultant Medical Microbiology and Virology in NHS (Part-time)
- 2013: Microbiological Health Officer at DSTL Porton Down
- 2008: Locum work in local Emergency Department







Primary Containment







The response to incidents in containment

- Occupational Health take the lead for any emergency on site
 - 0800-1700 Monday-Friday
 - Doctor and 2-3 nurses
 - They will not enter containment
- Primary role of the Microbiological Health Officer (MHO) is to provide specialist advice and practical help to Occupational Health
 - Out of hours cover
- Events are extremely rare
- However:
 - Anxiety and concern to the individual(s) involved
 - May be handling a pathogen with no recognised treatment
 - Consequences for themselves and their family
 - Public Health Consequences
 - Human, animal and plant health
 - Rumour and misinformation
 - About the pathogen
 - About Porton Down!







EXCLUSIVE: Major security breaches at testing ground for chemical and biological weapons

SIX major security breaches have taken place at the top-secret military base where the world's most deadly biological and chemical weapons are tested.











The response to incidents in containment

- The individual
 - Assess
 - Reassure
 - Treat
 - Injury/medical problem
 - Prophylaxis
 - Refer
 - Isolate
 - Usually livestock animal contact!

The key issues

- Face-to-face consultation with a familiar face
 - MHO on-site or within 30 minutes
- Discuss with Emergency Department/Acute Medicine if necessary
 - Dispel the myths and legends
- Know who to call for help
 - Specialist services for Viral Haemorrhagic Fever (VHF)
- Keep records!





The response to incidents in containment

- It may also be necessary to liaise with other agencies/individuals
 - Public Health
 - Family doctor
 - Liaise between individual, line management and hospital
 - Maintain medical confidentiality!
 - Keep records!
 - (Health and Safety Executive)
 - (Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs)
 - Incident involves organism covered by Specified Animal Pathogens Order (SAPO)





Case 1 – Typical case

- 27 year old working in isolator with Burkholderia pseudomallei
- Stretches to get universal container
- Glove rips





Case 1 – Typical case

- 27 year old working in isolator with Burkholderia pseudomallei
- Stretches to get universal container
- Glove rips
- Individual risk assessment
 - Negative pressure maintained
 - No actual culture or infected material spilled on to hand
 - Glove change
 - Wash hands and continue work. Incident reported
 - No MHO involvement





- 27 year old removing *Yersinia pestis* from -70°C freezer.
- Vial falls out and lid comes off
- Ice and "drops" on floor
- Individual makes safe reports incident by telephone.
- Advised to leave the laboratory
- Seen by MHO
 - Risk assessed Very low risk of inhaled exposure
 - Reassured
 - "Safety net"
 - No further action from MHO. Return to work





- 27 year old worker administering ciprofloxacin to mouse infected with Y. pestis
- Bitten. Both gloves compromised and small flap of skin raised at bite site. No blood. No obvious puncture wound.
- Reported incident. Self aid cleaned wound. Colleague made lab safe.
- MHO
 - Advised signs and symptoms of plague
 - Started ciprofloxacin 2 weeks
 - Daily reporting to line manager
 - No lab work for 2 weeks. Other duties.
 - Family doctor informed.





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 - No lab work for 2 weeks. Other duties.
 - Family doctor informed.

That was me!





Case 4 – "The man from Porton Down"

- Contacted by Emergency Department Consultant
 - 27 year old collapse ?cause
- Advised not a lab worker
 - No lab-based pathogen hazard. No chemical/toxin hazard
- Nothing further for MHO





Case 4 – "The man from Porton Down"

- Contacted by Emergency Department Consultant
 - 27 year old collapse ?cause from Porton Down
- DSTL but not a lab worker
 - No lab-based pathogen hazard. No chemical/toxin hazard
- Nothing further for MHO
- Porton Down has 3 sites PHE, DSTL and Science Park
- DSTL ~2500 on site with large transit population.
- ~70 people work at BSL-3
- ~12-15 at BSL-4





So what is routine.....

- Safety
 - Sit on 3 safety committees
 - Microbiology Safety Committee
 - Biological Research Safety Committee
 - Genetic Modification Safety Committee
 - Scrutinise safety procedures, lab protocols etc





- Project proposal to modify Francisella tularensis for vaccine studies
 - Using a kanamycin resistance marker
 - MHO raised concerns kanamycin is aminoglycoside would it induce class resistance to other aminoglycosides especially gentamicin (mainstay of therapy)?
 - Answer unknown
 - Mechanism of resistance not known
 - "We've always done it" "Everyone else does it"
- MHO not happy
- Literature review
 - Kanamycin resistant mechanism differed from mechanism that would confer resistance to gentamicin
- Antibiotic MIC measured
 - No evidence of cross resistance
- Project could proceed





So what is routine.....

- Safety
 - Sit on 3 safety committees
 - Microbiology Safety Committee
 - Biological Research Safety Committee
 - Genetic Modification Safety Committee
 - Scrutinise safety procedures, lab protocols etc
 - Clinical input where necessary
 - Teach
 - Containment and accident preparedness courses
 - Toxins and accident preparedness course
 - Curriculum for Immediate Responders course





So what is routine.....

- Staff screening
 - For staff working at BSL-3 and BSL-4
 - Not a physical examination
 - Occupational Health cover employment medicals and further surveillance
 - Opportunity for the MHO to introduce themself
 - Determine any underlying health problems
 - Any impact on working with dangerous pathogens
 - Determine any concerns
 - Outline risks of working in containment
 - Changes any health
 - Pregnancy
 - Immunosuppressive problems
 - Diabetes
 - Drugs e.g. DMARDS
 - Mental health





- 27 year old 8 weeks pregnant
- Not announced to other colleagues
- Works in containment
 - Advised same risks as everyone else
 - Consequences of an incident could be more serious
 - Avoid chemical solvents
 - Avoid lifting
- Worker decided to stop containment work few weeks later
 - She informed line manager
- Maintaining confidentiality is difficult
- Pregnancy uneventful





- 27 year old 8 weeks pregnant
- Not announced to other colleagues
- Advice as case 6
- Continued to work until 36 weeks
- Pregnancy uneventful





- Advice requested from a line manager
- Member of staff started on antidepressants
 - Worked in technical capacity within containment
 - A number of simultaneous significant life events
- Line manager had no concerns with performance or behaviour
- MHO advised no issues with continuing work





So what is routine.....

- Research
 - Clinical advice to projects
 - Antibiotics
 - Vaccines
 - Diagnostics
 - Other non-microbiological projects
- Advice and assistance to Occupational Health





In summary

- MHO
 - Microbiology/Infectious Disease Specialist
 - Recommend maintaining clinical currency
 - Understands the workings of containment
 - Has good working relationship with local medical facilities





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