


Looking Beyond the Risk Group: Risk Assessment Challenges in Models of Emerging and Zoonotic Disease

University of Pittsburgh

Department of Environmental Health & Safety

Molly S. Stitt-Fischer, PhD, CPH, CBSP, (SM)NRCM





# Risk Groups, Biosafety Levels, and Research

Risk Group	Infectious Agent – Severity of Disease	Treatment
1	Typically does not cause disease in healthy adults	Yes
2	Can cause disease; Not airborne	Yes
3	Can cause serious disease; Airborne transmission	Sometimes
4	Serious, and often potentially fatal disease	No



# Risk Groups, Biosafety Levels, and Research

Risk Group	BSL	Infectious Agent — Severity of Disease	Treatment
1	1	Typically does not cause disease in healthy adults	Yes
2	2	Can cause disease; Not airborne	Yes
3	3	Can cause serious disease; Airborne transmission	Sometimes
4	4	Serious, and often potentially fatal disease	No
<u> </u>		, 1	



# Risk Group



BSL



Risk Group



BSL



# Risk Group



BSL



# Human pathogen? Animal pathogen? Risk Group Transmission route? Aerobiology, imaging, etc.? Animal research? Species? Available facilities? Personnel performing work?




### Case Studies: Process and Potential Stumbling Blocks

- Juvenile baboon model of reemerging disease
  - Bordetella pertussis
     (pertussis; whooping cough)

- Host-pathogen interactions
  - Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis (Bd)



# Pertussis: A Reemerging Disease




 Agent mainly causes disease in children and infants, but adults may develop symptoms as well.

https://phil.cdc.gov/PHIL\_Images/09132002/00036/PHIL\_2121\_lores.jpg



# Pertussis: A Reemerging Disease




- Agent mainly causes disease in children and infants, but adults may develop symptoms as well.
- Exposure of infants to agent can lead to severe disease and high mortality.

https://phil.cdc.gov/PHIL\_Images/09132002/00036/PHIL\_2121\_lores.jpg



# Pertussis: A Reemerging Disease



- Agent mainly causes disease in children and infants, but adults may develop symptoms as well.
- Exposure of infants to agent can lead to severe disease and high mortality.
- Agent is contagious and spreads from person-to-person through direct contact and/or inhalation of respiratory droplets


https://phil.cdc.gov/PHIL\_Images/09132002/00036/PHIL\_2121\_lores.jpg



# Pertussis: A Reemerging Disease



Pertussis global annual reported cases and DTP3 coverage, 1980-2016




http://us.gsk.com/media/470873/print-ad\_final.jpg

Source: WHO/IVB database, 2017 194 WHO Member States. Data as of 19 July 2017





# Pertussis: A Reemerging Disease



https://www.cdc.gov/pertussis/surv-reporting.html



#### **2016 Provisional Pertussis Surveillance Report**

#### Reported Pertussis Incidence and Cases

	Incidence per 100,000)	No. of Cases
ALABAMA	3.3	160
ALASKA	19.5	144
ARIZONA	4.1	278
ARKANSAS	1.4	42
CALIFORNIA	2.8	1098
COLORADO	14.1	771
CONNECTICUT	2.3	81
DELAWARE	1.6	15
D.C.	1.3	9
FLORIDA	1.7	339

OKLAHOMA	3.1	121	
OREGON	4.5	180	
PENNSYLVANIA	11.4	1454	
RHODE ISLAND	6.7	/1	
SOUTH CAROLINA	3.7	180	
SOUTH DAKOTA	1.6	14	
TENNESSEE	2	131	
TEXAS	4.1	1119	
UTAH	6.9	206	
VERMONT	43.5	272	
VIRGINIA	2.2	181	
WASHINGTON	7.1	512	
WEST VIRGINIA	1.3	23	
WISCONSIN	21	1212	
WYOMING	3.1	18	
		****	
TOTAL	4.9	15737	

https://www.cdc.gov/pertussis/downloads/pertuss-surv-report-2016-provisional.pdf

# Risk Assessment: Infectious Agent





NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH

Genus **Bacteria** 

Bordetella

Species pertussis

NIH: 2 **BMBL\***: 2

Australia/New Zealand: 2

Belgium: 2

Germany: 2 notes: AR

EU: 2 notes: V Singapore: 2

Singapor Schedule:


Switzerland: 2

UK: 2 notes: Vaccine available

Human Pathogen: ∨ Animal Pathogen: n Plant Pathogen: n


Select Agent CDC: n Select Agent USDA: n





https://my.absa.org/tiki-index.php?page=Riskgroups&default%5bcontent%5d=bordetella





#### Containment Recommendations

BSL-2 practices, containment equipment, and facilities are recommended for all activities involving the use or manipulation of known or potentially infectious clinical material and cultures. ABSL-2 practices and containment equipment should be employed for housing experimentally infected animals. Primary containment devices and equipment, including biological safety cabinets, safety centrifuge cups or safety centrifuges should be used for activities likely to generate potentially infectious aerosols. BSL-3 practices, containment equipment, and facilities are appropriate for production operations.

# Risk Assessment: Animal Model



# What will our research entail?



BIANA

Pertussis disease and transmission and host responses: insights from the baboon model of pertussis

Marta V. Pinto a, Tod J. Merkel b.\*

Journal of Infection (2017) 74, S114—S119

BRIEF REPORT

# Airborne Transmission of *Bordetella pertussis*

Jason M. Warfel, 1 Joel Beren, 2 and Tod J. Merkel 1

<sup>1</sup>Division of Bacterial, Parasitic and Allergenic Products, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, and <sup>2</sup>Division of Veterinary Services, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, FDA, Bethesda, Maryland

The Journal of Infectious Diseases 2012;206:902-6



Risk Assessment: Treatments or Vaccines Available?



#### Vaccines and Work Practices: What should we recommend?

- An FDA-approved vaccination is available for *Bordetella pertussis* 
  - The University has a required vaccine program for other high risk pathogens
  - Should we require personnel to be boosted? Recommend?
  - Is vaccination enough given baboons develop severe disease?




### Vaccines and Work Practices: What should we recommend?

- Is there a possibility that fomites or worker exposure could lead to family and/or community risk?
  - High impact to infants and children
  - Work with baboons infected with *Bordetella pertussis* at ABSL-3



Are we being too conservative?

 Ask a peer review committee for their feedback on recommendations



http://www.safar.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/pictures/rangosresearch.jpg http://www.upmc.com/media/NewsReleases/2009/**PublishingImages**/CHP\_New\_Facade\_large.jpg



# Are we being too conservative?



http://bioethics.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/person-images/bioethics-inside-image%20%281%29.jpg

No.



https://i.pinimg.com/736x/a7/9f/1c/a79f1cd0cf6cbc9056de53ba92a025ab--children-s-hospital-encouragement.jpg



Case Study #2: What are factors to consider for work with an agent that is not infectious to humans?




Risk Assessment: Biological Agent Information



Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis (Bd)

 Chytrid fungus severely affecting amphibian species worldwide

Over 700 species have shown decline




Olson DH, Aanensen DM, Ronnenberg KL, Powell CI, Walker SF, et al. (2013) Mapping the Global Emergence of Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis, the Amphibian Chytrid Fungus. PLoS ONI 8(2): e56802. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056802



Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis (Bd)

- Chytrid fungus severely affecting amphibian species worldwide
  - Over 700 species have shown decline
- More species extinct than any other infectious disease known
  - At least 200




Olson DH, Aanensen DM, Ronnenberg KL, Powell CI, Walker SF, et al. (2013) Mapping the Global Emergence of Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis, the Amphibian Chytrid Fungus. PLoS ONE 8(2): e56802. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056802



# Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis (Bd)

Spread via pet trade/research/testing



African clawed frog Xenopus laevis




North American bullfrog *Lithobates catesbeianus* 

http://www.nationalgeographic.com/content/dam/animals/pictures/amphibians/a/american-bullfrog/american-bullfrog\_01.adapt.1900.1.JPG https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/corecgi/tileshop/tileshop.fcgi?p=PMC3&id=347300&s=24&r=1&c=1



## Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis (Bd): Natural Hosts



Northern leopard frog Lithobates pipiens



Aquatic salamander Cryptobranchus alleganiensis



Louisiana crayfish Procambarus clarkii



Everglades crayfish Procambarus alleni

http://phenomena.nationalgeographic.com/files/2012/12/Procambrus-clarkii.jpg http://www.michigan.gov/images/leopard\_frog\_102908\_7.jpg

https://u.osu.edu/enr5358/files/2017/04/hellbender-1b903v6.jpg

https://prd-wret.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/assets/palladium/production/s3fs-public/styles/full\_width/public/thumbnails/image/P.alleni%207.jpg?itok=9XpQP3Og



## Risk Assessment: Research Planned







https://toxics.usgs.gov/photo\_gallery/photos/armi/ARMI\_b\_boreas\_SpruceLK\_CWA\_l.jpg https://ecos.fws.gov/ServCat/DownloadFile/15727?Reference=16196

Lab Anim (NY). 2010 Sep;39(9):267-8.



## Research Plan: Field studies

- Field studies
  - Established SOPs to avoid cross contamination during sample collection
    - New nitrile gloves, separate sterile container for each animal or sample collected





### Research Plan: Field studies


- Field studies
  - Established SOPs to avoid cross contamination during sample collection
    - New nitrile gloves, separate sterile container for each animal or sample collected
  - Does this translate to the lab?






### Research Plans: In the lab

Culture Bd and intentionally infect animals






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


### Research Plans: In the lab

Culture Bd and intentionally infect animals

 Maintain research colonies of uninfected animals in common facility





https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/corecgi/tileshop/tileshop.fcgi?p=PMC3&id=347300&s=24&r=1&c=1 http://www.michigan.gov/images/leopard\_frog\_102908\_7.jpg



## Risk Assessment: Research Plans

 Do we have capacity to house infected animals in shared facility?







#### Risk Assessment: Research Plans

 Do we have capacity to house infected animals in shared facility?

 How would our other researchers feel about that?







# Risk Assessment: Logistics

 Can we renovate or otherwise modify existing research space to accommodate housing of infected animals?





J Am Assoc Lab Anim Sci. 2011 Jan; 50(1): 46-53.



# Risk Assessment: Logistics

 We will still need to house uninfected animals in the common housing area





J Am Assoc Lab Anim Sci. 2011 Jan; 50(1): 46–53.



# Risk Assessment: Logistics

- We will still need to house uninfected animals in the common housing area
  - Emphasize strict traffic patterns
  - Uninfected animals first
  - No re-entry to common housing area after work in laboratory space





J Am Assoc Lab Anim Sci. 2011 Jan; 50(1): 46-53.



# Risk Assessment: Logistics


 Use engineering controls and standard microbiological practices and PPE for culture of pathogen and handling of infected animals





# Risk Assessment: Logistics


 Already familiar with use of BSCs for cultures





# Risk Assessment: Logistics

- Already familiar with use of BSCs for cultures
- Lab coats?? Why would we need those?








https://www.cdc.gov/about/facts/cdcfastfacts/cdcfacts.html
https://ecos.fws.gov/ServCat/DownloadFile/15727?Reference=16196



### Risk Assessment: Logistics

- Waste disposal, transport, and storage of cultures
  - Biological waste storage and -80 freezers require personnel to walk past clean *Xenopus* facility





http://www.utsa.edu/safety/images/bio\_pickup\_procedure/3.png
http://mms.businesswire.com/media/20150412005035/en/462185/5/TSX front.jpg



### Risk Assessment: Logistics

- Waste disposal, transport, and storage of cultures
  - Secondary containers and surface disinfection






http://www.utsa.edu/safety/images/bio\_pickup\_procedure/3.png
http://mms.businesswire.com/media/20150412005035/en/462185/5/TSX front.jpg



### Risk Assessment: Personnel

- Undergraduate student researchers
  - Lack of research experience
  - Participation in laboratory and/or field work as part of courses



https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5d/Downtown\_Pittsburgh\_from\_Duquesne\_Incline\_in\_the\_morning.jpg



### Risk Assessment: Personnel


- Undergraduate student researchers
  - Can they recognize the importance of adhering to strict SOPs?
  - Required, documented training by PI



https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5d/Downtown Pittsburgh from Duquesne Incline in the morning.jpg




#### Lessons Learned: What is a Risk Assessment?





#### Lessons Learned: What is a Risk Assessment?





http://kitegy.com/



### Lessons Learned: A good investment

- Conversations with researchers and peer review committees are worth the time in the long run
  - Demonstrate that you are a resource



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- Conversations with researchers and peer review committees are worth the time in the long run
  - Demonstrate that you are a resource





http://www.biology.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/facilities-images/PLE/IMG\_1956.JPG http://www.biology.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/facilities-images/Facilities1.jpg



#### Lessons Learned: What other risks should be considered?

Take time to evaluate and communicate non-traditional risks





http://old.post-gazette.com/images5/thursday.pdf
https://www.gannett-cdn.com/sites/usatoday/images/site-masthead-logo-dark@2x.png



### Acknowledgements



Katy Board, MS, RBL Biosafety Officer and ARO
Jay Frerotte, MBA, Director and RO



