Analysis of CDC Import Permit Program Inspections from 2013 to 2017



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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Import Permit Program (IPP)

- CDC regulates the importation of infectious biological materials that could cause disease in humans in order to prevent their introduction and spread into the U.S.
 - Infectious biological agents capable of causing illness imumans (e.g., cultures of Zika virus).
 - Also applies for "suspected" select agents when an APHIS/CDC Form 2 is not applicable.
 - Materials known or reasonably expected to contain an infectious biological agent (e.g., blood from nonhuman primates).
 - Vectorsof human disease(e.g., live bats, mosquitoes).











Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Import Permit Program (IPP)

Most commonly impo	orted agents (2017):
1) Human Immunodeficiency Virus	11) Adenovirus
2) Escherichia coli	12) <i>Klebsiella</i> species
3) Zika virus	13) <i>Plasmodium</i> species
4) Hepatitis c virus	14) <i>Shigella</i> species
5) Hepatitis b virus	15) <i>Enterobacter</i> species
6) Dengue virus	16) Mycobacterium tuberculosis
7) Cytomegalovirus	17) <i>Campylobacter</i> species
8) <i>Streptococcus</i> species	18) Epstein-barr virus
9) <i>Salmonella</i> species	19) <i>Proteus</i> species
10) <i>Staphylococcus</i> species	20) <i>Enterococcus</i> species

CDC Import Permit Regulations

- In 2013, the regulations were amended, 42 CFR 71.54(h)
 - Issuance of a permit may be <u>contingent upon an inspection</u> of the importer's facility by the CDC to evaluate whether the importer's biosafety measures (e.g., physical structure and features of the facility, and operational and procedural safeguards) are commensurate with the hazard posed by the infectious biological agent, infectious substance, and/or vector, and the level of risk given its intended use.




Scope of CDC Import Permit Inspections

- Verify that biosafety measures are appropriate for the risks of the agent and work.
 - Are the practices and facility conducted in accordance with nationally recognized standards of practice (i.e., Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) **5 edition)?
- Verify the information submitted on the application.
 - Does the applicant have the safety level, primary containment, and personal protective equipment described on the application?
 - Is the work within the scope described on the application?
- Has the permittee complied with the conditions of the permit?

https://www.cdc.gov/phpr/ipp/inspection/index.htm


Number of Permits Issued Compared to the Number of Inspections

CDC IPP issues 2,000 import permits per year and inspects ~40 facilities annually using a risk -based approach.



Risk-Based Inspection Selection Criteria


- Guided by quantitative and objective scoring derived from the application and other sources.
 - Factors include:
 - Risk group(s) of the agent(s) requested
 - Biosafety level(s) reported
 - Culture or propagation activities
 - Work with animals or arthropods
 - History of importation or shipping non-compliance (e.g., CDC Quarantine Stations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Transportation)
 - Registration of laboratories with the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP)








Biosafety Levels Inspected: 2013-2017



Some inspections included multiple safety levels.


Import Permit Inspections Conducted: 2013 -2017



CDC Division of Select Agents and Toxins, Unpublished Data

Biosafety/Containment Findings From Inspections: 2013-2017

- Inspections that require corrective actions = 93%
- Average number of inspection findings = 6.5
 - Deficiencies in biosafety
 - Inaccurate applications
 - Importation without a permit
- Range of inspection findings
 - Minimum = 1
 - Maximum = 33



40% of inspections had 3 or fewer observations

Note: Inspection findings can be grouped together if there are multiple deficiencies due to a common observation. Formatted reports may show a lower number of "observations."

Biosafety/Containment Findings From Inspections: 2013-2017

■ Top 10 BSL2 inspection findings:

#	BSL-2	Standard
72	A9	Laboratory signage
60	B1	Advising personnel of hazards and entryequirements
35	A11	Training and information on personal health status
28	C3	Eye protection and decontamination before reuse
19	A2	Hand washing
18	C4b	Remove gloves and handwashing before leaving lab
18	D1	Self-closing lab doors and locks(according to policies)
17	C1a	Use of BSC for procedures with aerosol/splastotential
15	C2	Use of laboratorycoats/gowns
14	A5d	Broken glassware clean up procedures/equipment

Biosafety/Containment Findings From Inspections: 2013-2017

■ Top 10 BSL3 inspection findings:

#	BSL-3	Standard
60	A9	Laboratory signage
47	B1	Advising personnel of hazards and entryequirements
45	D9	Air flow shall not be reversed under failure conditions
33	C3	Eye protection and decontamination before reuse
28	A11	Training and information on personal health status
24	D15	Documented annual reverification of BSL3 parameters
23	D3	Laboratory canbe easily cleaned/decontaminated
22	B10	Use of BSC/physicadontainment for manipulations
14	D9a	Visual monitoring device toconfirm directional air flow
13	D2	Hands-free sink for hand washing

https://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5 /

Biosafety/Containment Findings From Inspections: 2013-Present

- High impact biosafety inspection findings:
 - BSL3 HVAC systems were not functioning properly.
 - A BSL3 facility was found to be under positive pressure under normal conditions.
 - Spills in centrifuges and potential exposures were not being reported to the laboratory supervisors/biosafety professionals/safety staff.
 - Biological safety cabinets and HEPA filters were out of certification.
 - In some instances, certifications were years out of date.

Application Inaccuracies: 2016 -2017

- Inspections allow for verification of information submitted on an application.
- Applications inspected that were inaccurate = 39%
 - In many cases mistakes or omissions were simple errors.
 - In some cases it appears that applications may have been falsified in attempts to acquire a permit.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV Public Health Service		APPLICATION BIOLOGICA							Applica	EXP	DRM APPROVED IS NO. 0920-0199 DATE 12/31/2019 Jumber:
Guidance for completing this form is submitted by mail, fax, or email attac Mailing Address: 1600 Clifton Road I E-mail: lmportPermit@cdc.gov . Tele	hment to th NE, Mailsto phone: 404	ne Centers for Dis p A-46, Atlanta, C -718-2077.	ease Contr SA 30333. F	ol and Pr Fax: 404	even 471-8	tion, Imp 8333.	his form oort Pen	n may be mit Program	Permit :	issu	ed
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Physical Address (NOT a post office to	ox)			6. C	ity				7. State	1	8. Zip Code
9. Permittee's Telephone Number		10. Permittee's		-				rmittee's En			
12. Secondary Contact's Name		13. Secondary	Contact's T	elephon	Nun	mber	14. Se	condary Cor	ntact's Email		
15. Will the permittee be the courier agent?	of the impo	rted biological	listed at	other me bove, in S ted to us No	ection	on A Bloo	ck 4, be d permi	t?	17. Check he have include Form to list of to use this p	d a C	continuation authorized
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10. Telephone	11. Fax			12. Emai			•			ed a	if you Continuation ple senders
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SECTION D -									Vector(s)		
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5. Destination Organization		estination Addres	S (NOT a pos			7. City			8. Stat		9. Žip Code
10. Telephone	11. F	ax		12	Ema	ail			13. Check in have include Form to list destination	ed a multi	Continuation

Application Inaccuracies: 2013 - Present

- Examples of low or moderate risk:
 - Some laboratory locations (of the same safety level) were not reported in the application.
 - Application reported the use of Powered Air Purifying Respirators (PAPRs), but only N95 respirators were available.

				T T						Biosafety Measures	
Scientific name of known/suspected biological agent(s) including Genus and species	 Strain Designation (list "N/A" if not applicable) 	6.	Location		ory or Storage one or both)	Laboratory Safety Level (Leave blank if storage only)	Person Responsible for Laboratory	Primary Containment to be used (Check all that apply) None (open bench) Class I Class II, Type	Personal Protective Measures to be used (Check all that apply) Gloves Protective Clothing Goggles and/or Face Shield	Personnel Training provided (Check all that apply) Risk(s) associated with the imported biological agent(s) Hazardous Material Packing/Shipping	Has the permittee implemented biosafety measures commensurate with the hazard posed by the infectious biological agent,
Scientific Name	Strain Designation	Bldg	Suite/Room	Lab	Storage	Safety Level	Responsible Person	Class III	Facemask	Laboratory Standard Practices	infectious substance, and/or
a.								Fume Hood Other (please describe):	Respirators: Type N95/100 PAPR	☐ Hazardous Waste Handling/Disposal ☐ Emergency Response Procedures	vector to be imported, and the level of risk given its intended
b.								Utilet (please describe):	Immunizations	Spill Procedures	use?
C.									Other (please describe):	Other (please describe):	☐ No ☐ Yes (Plan may be
d.											required to be submitted)
							al Destination of Imported Inf				
					or vector(s) diff Section A? No (skip to	tion of biological agent(ferent from address in Section E) Yes	\Rightarrow		4. MI		
					5. Destination Org	ganization 6. I	Final Destination Address (NOT a post of		8. State 9. Žip Code		
					10. Telephone		11. Fax	12. Email	13. Check here if you have included a Continuation		

Application Inaccuracies: 2013 - Present

Examples of high risk:

- Permittee claimed to have a BSB facility, but only had a BSB facility.
- Permittee claimed to have a BSB facility, but it had been shut down by the organization after a flood several years prior to the application.
- Permittee claimed to only conduct in vitrowork at BSL-2, but conducted work with live mosquitoes at ACL-3.

Importation of Infectious Materials Without a Permit: 2013-Present

Border Protection

- Infectious materials can be intercepted at ports of entry.
- Compliance inspections can occur in response to importations that occur without valid permits.
 - Self-reported by organization.
 - Complaints from a 3^d party.
 - Complaints from federal partners.
- 6 inspections found that materials were imported without a valid CDC import permit.
 - 1 instance was linked to a laboratory associated infection in 2016.

Impact of Inspections: 2013 -Present

■ 184 inspections were conducted from 2013 -2017.

- □ 12 permits were revoked .
 - 10 permittees did not have the biosafety level, containment, or facilities as described in the application for their permit.
 - 2 permittees did not allow inspection of their facility.
- 2 permit applications were voluntarily withdrawn in response to the inspection findings.
 - Permittees were not able meet ABSD or ABSL3 facility standards.

Impact of Inspections: 2013 -Present

- 2 permit applications were denied.
 - 1 permittee did not have their ABSL3 facility constructed at the time of the inspection.
 - 1 permittee was suspended bytheir organization for non-compliance.
- 2 permittees were unable to adequately address all inspection findings after 1 year.
 - Inspection findings were related to deficiencies in the HVAC of BSL facilities.
 - Both were placed on a watch list to prevent future issuance of permits, until corrective actions can be confirmed.
 - Information is shared with CDC quarantine stations and port of entry staff.

Conclusions

- Most inspections had findings that required corrective action, but 40% of all inspection reports had 3 or fewer observations.
 - Many organizations have strong oversight and biosafety.
- ~10% of inspections resulted in some type of significant action taken (e.g., revocation, denial, watch list).
- A substantial number (39%) of applications/permits inspected contain inaccurate information.

Conclusions

The 2013 revision to the import regulations has made a positive impact on biosafety and public safety.

 Onsite inspections by CDC benefit some organizations and individual permittees to identify and develop mitigation strategies to reduce overall risk of handling these imported materials .

Next Steps

The CDC IPP will continue to implement the regulations as revised in 2013 to verify that importers implement appropriate biosafety measures.

Increasing onsite inspections by CDC will better serve organizations and individual permittees to ensure necessary biosafety measures are in place for handling these imported materials.

Final Note: Release of eIPP

■ Released in August 2018



Addition of BSO contact information

3. Primary Permittee's Organiz
5. City *
7. Zip Code *
9. Permittee's Email *
agent? *
Contact's Telephone 13. Secondary Contact's Email
ext

https://eipp.cdc.gov/



Acknowledgements

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Discussion

https://www.cdc.gov/phpr/ipp/index.htm

importpermit@cdc.gov or 404-718-2077



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The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.



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